

LDS V10 Applet in EAC Configuration with AA

Public Security Target



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1.2 TOE Reference

TOE Commercial Name	LDS V10 in EAC configuration with AA on ID-One Cosmo V8.2
Applet Code Version	06 70 01 2F
Guidance Documents	[60][60], [61], [55], [56], [57] and [58]
Platform Name	ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform
Platform Certificate	ANSSI-CC-2019/28
Communication Protocol	Contact, Contactless and Dual
IC Identifier	NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022Y VB
IC Certificate	BSI-DSZ-CC-1059

Table 2: TOE REFERENCES

1.3 TOE Identification

The aim of the paragraphs is to allow the user to identify uniquely the TOE.

The TOE is composed of application [LDS V10 Security Target EAC configuration] and a COSMO v8.2 platform on the IC.

1.3.1 TOE Identification

This chapter presents the means to identify the evaluated application and the Platform.

The [LDS V10 Security Target EAC] installation command **shall** use the executable load File AID and module AID

Name	Value
Executable Load File (ELF) AID	A0000000770100000710000000000005
Executable Module AID	A0000000770100000710000100000005
Application AID	A00000024710FF

Table 3: AID LDS V10 Security Target EAC Configuration

1.3.2 Platform Identification

In order to assure the authenticity of the card, the product identification shall be verified by analysing:

Platform Name	ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform
Mask / Hardware Identification	091121
Label GIT code	IDOne_Cosmo_V8.2_091121
IC reference version	NXP P60D145
IC configuration	NXP P6022Y VB
IC ST identification	NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB Security Target Lite Rev. 2.1 — 6 April 2018 BSI-DSZ-CC-1059
IC EAL	EAL6 with augmentations: ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2
IC certificate	BSI-DSZ-CC-1059
Date of IC certification	2018-05-18

Table 4: Platform Identification

The evaluated platform allows the loading of patch. The patch reference is specified in the platform ST for ID-One Cosmo v8.2 Platform and the associated platform certificate.

1.3.3 Configuration of the platform

In the present evaluation, the loading of application (Java Card Applets) on the platform at use phase is allowed. It can be forbidden if requested by the product issuer.

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1.5 Definitions

DES	Data Encryption Standard
DF	Dedicated File
DH	Diffie Hellman
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EF	Elementary File
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory

Term	Definition
Document Basic Access Keys	Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD's chip and the inspection system. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security Object (SOD)	A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD's chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS).
Eavesdropper	A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the communication between the MRTD's chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD's chip.
Enrolment	The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's identity.
Extended Access Control (EAC)	Security mechanism identified in [48] by which means the MRTD's chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection System (EIS)	A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery	Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or the portrait.
Global Interoperability	The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs.
IC Dedicated Support Software	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Identification Data	The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer (i.e MRTD packaging responsible).
Impostor	A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person's document.
Improperly document person	A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else's travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required.
Initialisation	Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE.

Term	Definition
Initialization Data	Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD's material (IC identification data).
Inspection	The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity.
Inspection System (IS)	A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated Circuit (IC)	Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The MRTD's chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity	Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD's chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization	Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
Issuing State	The Country issuing the MRTD.
Logical Data Structure (LDS)	The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity expansion technology. The capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD's chip.
Logical MRTD	Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure, as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) (1) personal data of the MRTD holder, (2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1), (3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2), (4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and (5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). (6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel document	Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to) (1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory), (2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and (3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD)	Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read.
Machine Readable Visa (MRV)	A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a passport.
Machine Readable Zone (MRZ)	Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
Machine-verifiable biometrics feature	A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read and verified by machine.

2 Target of Evaluation

The product **LDS V10** is a multi-applicative Java Card product, embeddable in contact and/or contactless smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the **Pre-Personalization/Personalization phases** of the product [60].

The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data Structure as specified in [44]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, Extended Access Control [48], BAC [47] and Active Authentication.

It can host two types of applications as mentioned above, namely the **IDL** and **MRTD**. Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases other than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents.

This product is loaded on the platform, for details see ST [54].
The LDS V10 product architecture can be viewed as shown in the following figure:




Figure1: TOE Limits

2.1 TOE Overview

The TOE described in this security target is the EAC TOE of the product, conformant to Configuration 4. The product is composed of the functions: EAC, AA, CAM, PACE which are all presented in the chapter TOE architecture. Only some parts are in the scope of the evaluation of the present configuration.

Different configurations of the TOE are under evaluation. This ST considers only EAC and AA with Secure Messaging (DES + AES) on read DG3+DG4 after EAC.

Configuration	PP Conformity	Chip P60D145	Extensions
---------------	---------------	--------------	------------




Figure 2: Physical Form

The contactless ports of the module require connection to an antenna. The module relies on [ISO7816] and [ISO14443] card readers and antenna connections as input/output devices.

Port	Description	Logical Interface Type
VCC, GND	ISO 7816: Supply voltage	Power (not available in contactless-only configurations)
RST	ISO 7816:Reset	Control in (not available in contactless-only configurations)
CLK	ISO 7816: Clock	Control in (not available in contactless-only configurations)
I/O	ISO 7816: Input/ Output	Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (not available in contactless-only configurations)
LA, LB	ISO 14443: Antenna	Power, Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (Not available in Contact-only configurations)

Table 7: Ports and Interfaces

2.1.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

The TOE is an MRTD. It is an independent product and does not need any additional hardware/software/firmware to ensure its security.

In order to be powered up and to be able to communicate the TOE needs a card reader.

2.1.3 TOE Usage and major security features

State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.

In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field.

The MRTD in context of this security target contains:

- Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet
- A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area)
- And data elements stored on the TOE's chip for contact-less machine reading.

The authentication of the holder is based on:

- The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and
- The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored in the MRTD.

When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as "visa information"...

The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.

The MRTD can be viewed as the combination:

A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to)

- personal data of the MRTD holder
- The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book
- The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the device
- The printed portrait

A logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO and extended in [44][45][46] on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to)

- personal data of the MRTD holder
- The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1)
- The digitized portraits
- The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
- The other data according to LDS (up to DG24)
- The Document security object

The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD's chip is uniquely identified by the document number.

The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD's chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the MRTD's chip to the physical support.

The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD's chip.

The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active Authentication of the travel document's chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303, and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment. The Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.

The Security Target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism.

If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and certified separately. This is due to the fact that [47] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3).

The Active Authentication authenticates the contactless IC by signing a challenge sent by the IFD (inspection system) with a private key known only to the IC. For this purpose the contactless IC contains its own Active Authentication Key pair (KPrAA and KPuAA). A hash representation of Data Group 15 (Public Key (KPuAA) info) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated by the issuer's digital signature. The corresponding Private Key (KPrAA) is stored in the contactless IC's secure memory. By authenticating the visual MRZ (through the hashed MRZ in the Document Security Object (SOD)) in combination with the challenge response, using the eMRTD's Active Authentication Key Pair (KPrAA and KPuAA), the inspection system verifies that the Document Security Object (SOD) has been read from the genuine contactless IC, stored in the genuine eMRTD.

The Security Target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel document's chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving State or Organisation through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.

2.2 TOE Definition

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing and provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic Access Control, Extended Access Control and Active Authentication.

The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the **Pre-Personalization/Personalization phases** of the product.

The TOE comprises at least:

- Circuitry of the MRTD's chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
- IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software
- Cosmo V8.2 Platform
- API

- LDS V10 application
- Associated guidance documentation

The platform provides an operational environment for the application: all cryptographic algorithm implementations and associated self-tests, random number and key generation, card lifecycle management, and key storage and protection are provided by the platform. The code for this functionality is contained in the platform ROM. However, the factory configuration of the module constrains the module to the set of services provided by the platform's Card Manager (implementing a standard set of GlobalPlatform services),

The applet may be used on a contact mode compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-3 specification or on contactless mode compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 specification.

2.3 TOE Architecture

The TOE is a smartcard, composed of IC, Java Card Platform and the LDS application. Other applications may reside in the TOE.

2.3.1 Integrated Circuit

The TOE is embedded on NXP chips; more information on the chips is given in the related Public Security Target identified in table 3 of chapter 1.3.2.

2.3.2 Java Card Platform

The Operating System is based on Java Card Technology and Global Platform technology. His main responsibilities are:

- providing interface between the Integrated Circuit and the applet
- providing to the applet, basic services to access to memories and all needed cryptographic operations
- ensuring global management of the card (loading, installation and deletion of applets) and monitor the security of the card (data integrity and physical attacks counter-measures). For details see [54].

2.3.3 Application Functionalities

This application stores the personal information related to the cardholder of an MRTD or an IDL. It also allows governmental organizations to retrieve these pieces of data.

The applet supports the authentication mechanisms described in ICAO and EAC specifications and ISO/IEC 18013-3 ISO Compliant Driving License specification with a fully configurable access control management over the EFs (EFs).

The applet may be used on a contact mode (compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-3 specification) and/or contactless mode (compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 specification).

The compliancy of the applet to LDS, EAC, or IDL, is achieved provided a correct personalization is performed. The correct authentication mechanisms and access conditions over the EFs must be assigned.

In summary, the applet supports the following authentication mechanisms stated in the ICAO specifications (for MRTD) and the ISO Compliant Driving License standard (for IDL):

- Active Authentication (AA)
- Basic Access Control (BAC)
- Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
- Extended Access Control (EAC)

- Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM)

All authentication mechanisms are listed in the following chapters, all are part of the product but only some are part of the present evaluation.

2.3.3.1 Active Authentication (AA)

Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip.

Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.

The key and algorithms supported are the following:

RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024 bits, 1536 bits or 2048 bits and hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2.

ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192 to 512.

AES-256 using ISO/IEC 9797-1 M2 padding method.

TDES with double and triple length keys using ISO/IEC 9797-1 M2 padding method.

2.3.3.2 Basic Access Control (BAC)

The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [47] Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD's data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [41] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.

The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection system

Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),

Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.

The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the logical MRTD (data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication.

Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the communication between the chip and the IS.

This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:

Configuration	Key Algo	Key Length	Hash Algo	MAC Algo
BAC	3DES 2Key	16-bytes	SHA-1	Retail MAC

Table 8: BAC Configuration

2.3.3.3 Terminal Authentication

The Terminal Authentication Protocol is a two move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the terminal.

This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data. As the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen by the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication. The MRTD chip MUST bind the terminal's access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated ephemeral public key of the terminal.

2.3.3.4 Chip Authentication

The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.

The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two advantages over the original protocol:

Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are non-transferable.

Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.

The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.

The protocol in Version 2 provides explicit authentication of the MRTD chip by verifying the authentication token and implicit authentication of the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.

2.3.3.5 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)

PACE is an access control mechanism that is supplemental to BAC. It is a cryptographically stronger access control mechanism than BAC since it uses asymmetric cryptography compared to BAC's symmetric cryptography.

PACE is realized through 5 commands:

1. MSE SET – AT command
2. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Encrypted Nonce
3. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Map Nonce
4. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Perform Key Agreement
5. GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command – Mutual Authentication

Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the communication between the chip and the IS.

This table lists the supported configurations for PACE protocol:

Configuration	Mapping	Key Algo	Key Length (in bytes)	Secure Messaging	Auth. Token	Hash Algo
PACE-ECDH-GM-3DES	Generic	3DES 2Key	16	CBC / Retail MAC	Retail MAC	SHA- 1
PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-128	Generic	AES	16	CBC / CMAC	CMAC	SHA- 1
PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-192	Generic	AES	24	CBC / CMAC	CMAC	SHA- 256
PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-256	Generic	AES	32	CBC / CMAC	CMAC	SHA- 256
PACE-ECDH-IM-3DES	Integrated	3DES 2Key	16	CBC / Retail MAC	Retail MAC	SHA- 1
PACE-ECDH-IM-AES-128	Integrated	AES	16	CBC / CMAC	CMAC	SHA- 1
PACE-ECDH-IM-AES-192	Integrated	AES	24	CBC / CMAC	CMAC	SHA- 256
PACE-ECDH-IM-AES-256	Integrated	AES	32	CBC / CMAC	CMAC	SHA- 256

PACE-CAM is realized the same way as § 2.3.3.6. The only difference is that the chip computes the Chip Authentication Data using the chip's static private key then sends this data to the terminal. The terminal verifies the authenticity of the chip using the recovered Chip Authentication Data.

2.3.3.8 Match On-Card (MOC) Verification

MOC verification may be used to grant some access rights to EFs.

This feature relies on the services provided by the CHV Server applet MOC verification is supported if the *CHV Configuration* is properly configured in the install parameter. Once the MOC verification is allowed the applet will permit the use of CHV-related commands that handles biometric and Global PIN credentials.

2.3.3.9 PIN

The product supports the management of card holder credentials such as Cardholder PIN and Global PIN which can be used to grant access rights to EFs or keys. The Cardholder PIN and Global PIN each have its PIN Unblocking Key (Cardholder PUK and Global PUK, respectively). These PINs and corresponding PUKs have to be initialized during personalization if they are used to protect access to EFs and keys.

2.3.3.10 Watermarking

The watermarking feature may be used to restrict the access to the plain image data of particular EF(s). Enabling the watermarking will cause the image data to be corrupted during the reading of the file contents.

The de-watermarking conditions should be configured accordingly and these conditions must be satisfied in order to grant access to the plain image data, details are in the dedicated security Target.

2.3.3.11 Secure Messaging

The TOE supports the ISO Secure Messaging. It provides a secure channel (i.e. encrypted and authenticated) between application and terminal. Secure Messaging can be set up by Chip Authentication, PACE, or Basic Access Control. The provided security level depends on the mechanism used to set up Secure Messaging.

A session is started when secure messaging is established. The session only ends with the release of secure messaging, e.g. by sending a command without secure messaging.

2.3.3.12 IDEMIA Cryptographic library

A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by IDEMIA.

This cryptographic library is embedded on the TOE to provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It is implemented at the platform level and are already in the scope of the platform evaluation.

2.3.4 IDEMIAMechanism included in the scope of the evaluation

All TOE functionalities are presented in the previous chapter.

The present evaluation includes the listed functionalities:

- EAC
- AA
- CAM
- Secure Messaging (DES + AES) on read DG3+DG4 after EAC

2.4 TOE Guidance

The TOE is identified as follows:

Application Guidance	
TOE name (commercial name)	LDS V10 on ID-One Cosmo v8.2
Guidance document for preparation	Personalization Manual [60]
Guidance document for operational use	User Manual [61]
Platform Guidance	
Guidance document for Platform Pre-personalisation	COSMO V8.2 Pre-Perso Guide [57]
Developer of sensitive applications*	COSMO V8.2 Security Recommendations [56]
Guidance for application developer*	COSMO V8.2 Reference Guide [58]
Guidance to Issuer of the platform that aims to load applications*	COSMO V8.1-N Application Loading Protection Guidance [55]

Table 10: TOE Guidance REFERENCES

3 TOE Life Cycle

3.1 TOE Life Cycle Overview




Figure 3: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE

The TOE life-cycle classically described in terms of four life-cycle phases is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.

The roles involved in the different steps are listed in the following table:

Roles	Subjects
IC manufacturer	NXP Semiconductors
TOE developer	IDEMIA
Manufacturer	NXP Semiconductors IDEMIA or another agent
Prepersonalizer	IDEMIA or another agent
Personalization Agent	IDEMIA or another agent

Table 11: Roles Identification on the life cycle.

3.2 TOE Life Cycle when the Application code is ROMed

The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle, the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the coverage in the case a).

Steps	Phase	Subject	Covered by
Step 1	Development	IDEMIA	ALC R&D sites
Step 2	Development	NXP Semiconductors	IC certification
Step 3	Manufacturing	NXP Semiconductors	IC certification
TOE delivery point			
Step 4	Manufacturing	MRTD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer)	AGD_PRE
Step 5	Manufacturing	MRTD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer)	AGD_PRE
Step 6	Personalization	Personalization Agent	AGD_PRE
Step 7	Operational Use	End user	AGD_OPE

Table 12: Subjects identification following life cycle steps

Details for each phase/step are presented in the following paragraphs.

3.3 Phase 1 “Development”

(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

The TOE includes the LDS V10 application and the Platform.
The LDS and Platform are both developed at IDEMIA R&D sites.
The sites are audited following MSSR last requirements.

(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the eMRTD application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer.

3.4 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”

(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the *delivery process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer.* If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer adds initialization data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK).

The end of step 3 is the TOE delivery.

(Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only.

(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document's chips with pre-personalization Data.

The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.

3.5 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”

(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes:
the survey of the travel document holder's biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data),
(iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and
(v) configuration of the TSF if necessary.

The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of

(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and
(iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder.

The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.

3.5.1 Loading of application

The platform can host 2 kinds of applications: Evaluated sensitive applications and validated basic applications. Once the application is evaluated or validated, it is securely delivered to manufacturing site. This delivery ensures the integrity and confidentiality of the application code and data. Then applications code and data are securely stored.

The delivery, storage and loading of any application are covered by audited Organisational measures (ALC).

Applications can be loaded at pre issuance at step 5 or at step 6 or in post issuance.

3.5.2 Applet pre-personalisation (phase 6)

This phase is performed by the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. During this phase, the Java Card applet is prepared as required by P.TOE_Construction.

All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation Agent prior to any operation.

3.5.3 TOE personalisation (phase 6)

This phase is performed by the Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE, which is in charge of the Java Card applet personalisation.

All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalisation Agent prior to any operation.

This phase may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be performed anywhere. The Personalisation Agent is responsible for ensuring a sufficient level of security during this phase.

The Java Card applet is personalized according to guidance document [57].

At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed.


3.6 Phase 4 “Operational Use”

(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.

Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.

3.7 TOE Life Cycle when the Application code is loaded in E2PROM

This chapter presents when the application is loaded in E2prom, case b.



!

Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE when the application is loaded in E2prom.

When the LDS application is loaded on the Platform at Phase 5; the entity responsible of the loading is the manufacturer:

- The Manufacturer (phase 5) loads the LDS application code (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document's chips with pre-personalization Data.
- The pre-personalized travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent (AGD)

When the LDS application is loaded on the Platform at Phase 6; the entity responsible of the loading is the Personalization Agent:

- The Personalization Agent (phase 6) loads the LDS application code (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document's chips with pre-personalization Data.
- The MRTD is also personalized, in this step, as defined in the chapter 3.5.3.
- The personalization phase can also occur in phase 7, by the Issuer.

When the LDS application is loaded on the Platform at Phase 7; the entity responsible of the loading is the issuer, the Pre-Personalization and the Personalisation of the MRTD is under the Issuer responsibility. All required information is securely given (application code and AGD_PRE and

AGD_OPE). The loading follows Platform requirements as defined in the COSMO V8.1-N Application Loading Protection Guidance [55].

Step	Possible operations	Required document form the platform	Required document form the application
Step 5	MRD Manufacturer (Pre-Personalizer) Loading and Pre-Personalization	COSMO V8.1-N Application Loading Protection Guidance [55]	Application code Personalization Manual [60]
Step 6	Loading and Pre-Personalization and personalisation	COSMO V8.1-N Application Loading Protection Guidance [55]	Application code Personalization Manual [60]
Step 7	Loading and Pre-Personalization and personalisation	COSMO V8.1-N Application Loading Protection Guidance [55]	Application code Personalization Manual [60] User Manual [61]

Table 13: Required inputs for each case

4 Conformance Claim

4.1 Conformance claim

This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5 ([1][2][3]). The conformance to the Common Criteria is claimed as follows:

CC	Conformance rationale
Part 1	Strict conformance
Part 2	Conformance to the extended ¹ part: FAU_SAS.1 "Audit Storage" FCS_RND.1 "Quality metric for random numbers" FMT_LIM.1 "Limited capabilities" FMT_LIM.2 "Limited availability" FPT_EMS.1 "TOE Emanation" FIA_API.1 "Authentication Proof of Identity"
Part 3	Strict conformance to Part 3. The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented ² with: ALC_DVS.2 "Sufficiency of security measures" AVA_VAN.5 "Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis"

Table 14: Conformance Rationale

4.2 Protection Profile claims

The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2: Machine Readable Travel Documents with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control [48].

4.3 Protection Profile Additions

The rationale between the SPD, taking into account the additional elements of the SPD, and the Objectives and Objectives on the operational environment are given in the paragraph Rationales.

4.3.1 SFR dispatch versus PP

The following table present a rationale between the SFR driven from the protection profile versus the SFR from this security target:

SFR from the PP	Dispatch in the ST (detailed SFR in chapter 8)
FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1/BAC
FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4/Global

¹ The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP

² This EAL and its augmentations correspond to an EAL5+ALC_DVS.2 where AVA_VAN level is downgraded to AVA_VAN.3 following constraint of [R10] about MRZ/keydoc entropy

SFR from the PP	Dispatch in the ST (detailed SFR in chapter 8]
FCS_COP.1/SHA	FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_ECC FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA
FCS_COP.1/SYM	FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC
FCS_COP.1/MAC	FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER	FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA
FCS_RND.1	FCS_RND.1/Global
FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1/CA
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1/CA
FIA_UAU.4	FIA_UAU.4/TA FIA_UAU.4/BAC
FIA_UAU.5	FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES FIA_UAU.5/EAC
FIA_UAU.6	FIA_UAU.6/CA
FIA_API.1	FIA_API.1/CA
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1/EAC
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/EAC
FDP_UCT.1	FDP_UCT.1/CA FDP_UCT.1/BAC
FDP_UIT.1	FDP_UIT.1/CA FDP_UIT.1/BAC
FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1/TA
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.1/Global FMT_LIM.1/EAC FMT_LIM.1/BAC
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.2/Global FMT_LIM.2/EAC FMT_LIM.2/BAC
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	FMT_MTD.1/ INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	FMT_MTD.1/ INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI	FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD	FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE	FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_DATE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK	FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.3	FMT_MTD.3/EAC
FPT_EMS.1	FPT_EMS.1/Global FPT_EMS.1/CA
FPT_FLS.1	FPT_FLS.1/Global
FPT_TST.1	FPT_TST.1/Global FPT_TST.1/CA FPT_TST.1/TA FPT_TST.1/BAC
FPT_PHP.3	FPT_PHP.3.1/Global
FAU_SAS.1	FAU_SAS.1

SFR from the PP	Dispatch in the ST (detailed SFR in chapter 8]
FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1/BAC
FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4/Global

Table 15: PP SFR

4.3.2 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST

Notation:

For optimisation and ease read, all the SFR presented in chapter Security Functional Requirements have extensions as presented here:

SFR (**/Global**) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE)

SFR (**/AA**) that are dedicated for Active Authentication

SFR (**/BAC**) that are dedicated for Basic Access Control

SFR (**/CA**) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication

SFR (**/TA**) that are dedicated for Terminal Authentication

SFR (**/EAC**) that are dedicated for Extended Access Control

4.3.3 Complete overview of the SFR

From the PP, the following table lists the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation.

SFR from the PP
FAU_SAS.1; FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1/SHA ; FCS_COP.1/SYM ; FCS_COP.1/MAC ; FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER ; FCS_RND.1; FIA_UID.1; FIA_UAU.1; FIA_UAU.4 ; FIA_UAU.5; FIA_UAU.6 ; FIA_API.1 ; FDP_ACC.1 ; FDP_ACF.1 ; FDP_UCT.1 ; FDP_UTI.1 ; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_SMR.1; FMT_LIM.1; FMT_LIM.2 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD ; FMT_MTD.1/DATE ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE ; FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ; FMT_MTD.3; FPT_EMS.1 ; FPT_FLS.1; FPT_TST.1; FPT_PHP.3

Table 16: SFR from the PP

The following table presents the additional SFRs and express its functionality.

Section	Additional SFR
Active Authentication	FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ; FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Additional functionality	FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE

Table 17: additional SFR

The following table presents Global SFR overview:

Global SFR	Additional?	ST generic notation
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FCS_CKM.4/Global	No	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1/Global	No	FCS_RND.1
FMT_LIM.1/Global	No	FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2/Global	No	FMT_LIM.2
FPT_EMS.1/Global	No	FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1/Global	No	FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1/Global	No	FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3/Global	No	FPT_PHP.3

Table 18: Global SFR overview

The following table presents the dedicated SFRs for Active Authentication (AA)

Active Auth. SFR	AdditionalSFR?	ST generic notation
FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA	Yes	FCS_COP.1/AA
FDP_DAU.1/AA	Yes	FDP_DAU.1/AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA	Yes	FDP_ITC.1/AA
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ	Yes	FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
FPT_EMS.1/AA	No	FPT_EMS.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA	Yes	FMT_MOF.1/AA
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE	Yes	FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE

Table 19: Additional SFR for the Active Authentication

The following table presents the SFRs for BAC PP, all are issued from the PP.

BAC SFR	Additional?	ST generic notation
FCS_CKM.1/BAC	No	FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC	No	FCS_COP.1/AUTH FCS_COP.1/ENC FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA	No	FCS_COP.1/SHA
FDP_UCT.1/BAC	No	FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1/BAC	No	FDP_UIT.1
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ	No	FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_LIM.1/BAC	No	FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2/BAC	No	FMT_LIM.2
FPT_TST.1/BAC	No	FPT_TST.1
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE	No	FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FDP_ACC.1/BAC	No	FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1/BAC	No	FDP_ACF.1
FMT_SMR.1/BAC	No	FMT_SMR.1
FIA_AFL.1/BAC	No	FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.6/BAC	No	FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UID.1/BAC	No	FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1/BAC	No	FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4/BAC	No	FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.5/BAC	No	FIA_UAU.5

Table 20: BAC SFR overview

CA SFR	Additional?	ST generic notation
FIA_API.1/CA	No	FIA_API.1



FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES	No	FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES	No	FCS_COP.1
FIA_UAU.1/CA	No	FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES	No	FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6/CA	No	FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UID.1/CA	No	FIA_UID.1
FPT_EMS.1/CA	No	FPT_EMS.1
FPT_TST.1/CA	No	FPT_TST.1
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE	No	FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ	No	FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FDP_UCT.1/CA	No	FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1/CA	No	FDP_UIT.1

Table 21: CA SFR overview

TA SFR	Additional?	ST generic notation
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_ECC FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA	No	FCS_COP.1
FIA_UAU.4/TA	No	FIA_UAU.4
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD	No	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_DATE	No	FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FPT_TST.1/TA	No	FPT_TST.1
FMT_SMR.1/TA	No	FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI	No	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI

Table 22: TA SFR overview

EAC SFR	Additional?	Dispatch in the ST
FDP_ACC.1/EAC	No	FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1/EAC	No	FDP_ACF.1
FMT_MTD.3/EAC	No	FMT_MTD.3
FIA_UAU.5/EAC	No	FIA_UAU.5
FMT_LIM.1/EAC	No	FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2/EAC	No	FMT_LIM.2

Table 23 - EAC SFR overview

Additional functionality SFR	Additional?	Dispatch in the ST
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE	No	FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE	No	FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
FMT_MTD.1/UPD-FILE	No	FMT_MTD.1/UPD-FILE

FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL	No	FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL
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Table 24: Additional Functionality SFR overview

4.3.4 Overview of the additional protocols

4.3.4.1 Active Authentication

The additional functionality of Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys.

It implies the following addition to the standard PP:

Additional Threats: **§ 1.1.1**

Additional Assumptions: **§ 5.5.2 Assumptions for AA**

Additional Objective: **§ 6.1.2 SO for AA**

Additional OE: **§ 6.2.2 OE for AA**

4.3.5 OE for AA rationale

The objectives **OE.Exam_MRTD_AA**, **OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA**, **OE.Activ_Auth_Verif** and **OE.Activ_Auth_Sign** define additional requirements on the operational environment for the Active Authentication Protocol which is not in the original scope of the PP BAC. This OE is only linked to threat and OSP for the Active Authentication and has no links with those of the PP.

4.3.6 Assumption for AA rationale

The **A.Insp_Sys_AA** is added, this assumption is only linked to Active Authentication mechanism as the Inspection System has to implement the mechanism and shall verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.

MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.

Country Verifying Certification Authority

The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.

MRTD Holder

Is the rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.

Traveler

Is the person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.

Attacker

Is a threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD's chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.

Application Note

An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.

5.2 Assets

Logical MRTD data

The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [43]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (CAPK) in EF.DG 14 is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.

The Active Authentication Public Key (AAPK) Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Active Authentication of the chip.

The current EAC Security Target is dedicated to the protection of both Active Authentication EF.DG15 (see below) and sensitive biometric EF.DG3&4.

The other one (and associated keys) are described and managed in the related BAC Security Target.

All these data may be sorted out in two different categories:

If they are specific to the user, they are User data

If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data.

User Data	Description
CPLC Data	Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder
Personnal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DGx, except EF.DG15)	Contains identification data of the holder

User Data	Description
Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD	Contain a certificate ensuring the integrity of the file stored within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data are issued by a genuine country
Common data in EF.COM	Declare the data the travel document contains. This data is optional and may be absent in the TOE
Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 (AAPK)	Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to the Active Authentication
Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14 (CAPK)	Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to the Chip Authentication Protocol
Updatable Data	Data other than Personal Data, Biometric Data, EF.COM, EF.SOD, CA_PK, CA_SK, AA_PK, AA_SK, CPLC, TOE_ID, Pre-Perso_K, Perso_K, Session_K, Configuration Data which can be modified in Operational Use phase.

Table 25: User Data

TSF Data	Description
TOE_ID	Data enabling to identify the TOE
Prepersonalizer reference authentication data	Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer
Personalization Agent reference authentication Data	Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization Agent
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key	Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
Active Authentication private key (AAK)	Private key the chip uses to perform an Active Authentication
Chip Authentication private key (CAK)	Private key the chip uses to perform a Chip Authentication
Session keys for the secure channel	Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
Life Cycle State	Life Cycle state of the TOE

Table 26: TSF Data

Authenticity of the MRTD's chip

The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.

5.3 Threats

This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.

Application note: The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming (cf [47]) are averted by the mechanisms described in the BAC PP which cannot withstand an attack with high attack potential thus these are not addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of tracing the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD's chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface. T.Skimming addresses the threat of imitating the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. Both attacks are conducted by an attacker who cannot read the MRZ or who does not know the physical MRTD in advance.

5.3.1 Threats from the PP EAC

T.Read_Sensitive_Data

Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRTD's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD's chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical MRTD as well.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data

T.Forgery

Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder's identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD's chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs.

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.

T.Counterfeit

Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data

T.Abuse-Func

Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Information_Leakage

Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even

for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.

T.Phys-Tamper

Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD's chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD's chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD's chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.

The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD's chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD's chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Malfunction

Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD's chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD's chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: integrity and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

1.1.1 Additional Threats for additional data

T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data "Forgery of supplemental data stored in the TOE"

Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF document security object. This may lead the extended inspection system (EIS) using these data to be deceived.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs.

Asset: authenticity of data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF document security object

5.4 Organisational Security Policies

5.4.1 OSP from PP EAC

P.BAC-PP

The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the "ICAO Doc 9303" as well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with

"ICAO Application", Basic Access Control" [47] in order to ensure the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.

Application note: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [43] is addressed by the [47] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal data other than EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf.[47]). The TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric reference data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack potential. Due to the different resistance the protection of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated protection profiles, which is assumed to result in technically separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and certificates.

P.Sensitive_Data

The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD's chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication.

P.Manufact

The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.

P.Personalization

The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.

5.4.2 OSP for AA

P.Activ_Auth

The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [47].

5.5 Assumptions

The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used.

5.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC

A.MRTD_Manufact

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

A.MRTD_Delivery

Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage.

Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.

A.Pers_Agent

The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD's chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD's chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.

A.Insp_Sys

The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.

The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.

A.Signature_PKI

The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.

A.Auth_PKI

The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD's chip.

5.5.2 Assumptions for AA

A.Insp_Sys_AA

The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.

6 Security Objectives

6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.

6.1.1 SO from PP EAC

OT.AC_Pers

The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS [43] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.

OT.Data_Int

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication data.

OT.Sens_Data_Conf

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

OT.Identification

The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). The storage of the Prepersonalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).

OT.CA_Proof

The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip Authentication. The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func

After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to:

- (i) Disclose critical User Data
- (ii) Manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software
- (iii) Manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software
- (iv) Bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.

Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip:

- By measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
- By forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- By a physical manipulation of the TOE.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper

The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of

- Measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- Measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)

with a prior

- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

OT.Prot_Malfunction

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent signs. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.

6.1.2 SO for AA

OT.AA_Proof

The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [43]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

OT.Data_Int_AA

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication.

1.1.1 Additional SO

OT.Update_File "Modification of file in Operational Use Phase"

During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow the modification of Updatable Data if the write access to these objects is fulfilled by the Terminal.

OT.AC_SM_Level "Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level"

During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow read access to sensitive biometric data only if the Secure Messaging level reaches or exceeds the one specified in the biometric data Access Conditions data object.

6.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment

6.2.1 OE from PP EAC

6.2.1.1 Issuing State or Organization

The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.MRTD_Manufact

Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.

During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.ok

OE.MRTD_Delivery

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:

non-disclosure of any security relevant information

identification of the element under delivery

meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment)

physical protection to prevent external damage

secure storage and handling procedures (including rejectd TOE"s)

traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:

origin and shipment details

reception, reception acknowledgement

location material/information.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.

Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.

OE.Personalization

The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.

OE.Pass_Auth_Sign

The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [43].

OE.Auth_Key_MRTD

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to:
(i) Generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair

- (ii) Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14
- (iii) Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD's holders to authorized receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.

OE.BAC_PP

It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control" [47]. This is necessary to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.

6.2.1.2 Receiving State or Organization

The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.Exam_MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [43].

OE.Pass_Auth_Verif

The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).

OE.Ext_Insp_Systems

The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD's chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.

6.2.2 OE for AA

OE.Exam_MRTD_AA

Additionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA

Additionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active Authentication Protocol.

OE.Activ_Auth_Verif

In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.

OE.Activ_Auth_Sign

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRTD's Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD's Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

7 Extended requirements

7.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage

7.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1

Description: see [47].

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: see [47]

7.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers

7.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1

Description: see [48]

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: See [48]

7.3 Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity

7.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1

Description: see [48]

FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: See [48]

7.4 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability

7.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1

Description: see [47]

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)

Rationale: See [47]

7.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2

Description: See [47]

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)

Rationale: See [47]

7.5 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation

7.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1

Description: see [47]

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: See [47]

8 Security Requirements

8.1 Security Functional Requirements

This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements:

- **Global SFR** that are applicable to all the passports configuration
- **Active Authentication SFR** that cover the Active Authentication Protocol
- **BAC SFR** that cover the Basic Access Control
- **CA SFR** that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol
- **TA SFR** that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication Protocol is only available with the Extended Access Control)
- **EAC SFR** that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC protocol is a combination of TA and CA, this chapter only contains SFR that cannot be strictly applied to one or another)
- And **Additional SFRs** to cover additional functionalities of the TOE. See chapter 8.1.7.

8.1.1 Global SFR

This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different parts of the embedded application on the product.

FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **zeroisation** that meets the following: **none**.

FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet

1. **Deterministic Hybrid random number as defined in [54]**
2. **The requirement of FIPS SP800-90 [18] for random number generation.**

FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:

1. **User Data to be manipulated**
2. **TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated**
3. **Software to be reconstructed**
4. **Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks**

FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

- 1. User Data to be manipulated**
- 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated**
- 3. Software to be reconstructed**
- 4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks**

FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to

- 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16**

FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to

- 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16**

FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state

FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

- 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur**
- 2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.**

FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF, at the conditions:

- 1. At reset**

FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **stored TSF executable code**.

FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack

FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist **physical manipulation and physical probing** to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

8.1.2 Active Authentication SFR

FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform [**cryptographic operation**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Operation	Algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standard
Digital Signature Creation	RSA signature (CRT) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512	1024, 1536 and 2048.	[24]

FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform [**cryptographic operation**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Digital Signature Creation	ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512	192 to 512 over prime field curves	[24][28][29][30]

FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication

FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of **the TOE itself**.

FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide **any users** with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.

Refinement:

Evidence generation and ability of verifying it constitute the Active Authentication protocol.

FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes

FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the **Active Authentication Access Control SFP** when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: **none**.

FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the **AAK** to **none**.

FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to

- 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)**

FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to

- 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)**

FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour

FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF Active Authentication to Personalization Agent.

FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to Personalization Agent.

8.1.3 Basic Access Control SFR

8.1.3.1 Common Basic Access Control SFR

FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm	112	[43]

FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_AUTH The TSF shall perform [**cryptographic operation**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Symmetric authentication, encryption and decryption	3DES	112	[12]

FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA The TSF shall perform [**cryptographic operation**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Hashing	SHA1	None	[29]

FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC The TSF shall perform **[cryptographic operation]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[cryptographic algorithm]** and cryptographic key sizes **[cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following **[standard]**:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging (BAC) – encryption and decryption	3DES in CBC mode	112	[17][12]

FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC The TSF shall perform **[cryptographic operation]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[cryptographic algorithm]** and cryptographic key sizes **[cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following **[standard]**:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging MAC	Retail MAC	112	[47]

FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality

FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors

FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification, deletion, insertion and replay** has occurred

FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to [authorized identified roles]:

TSF Data	Authorized Identified roles
Document Access Keys	None

FMT_LIM.1/BAC Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

- 1. User Data to be disclosed**

FMT_LIM.2/BAC Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

- 1. User Data to be disclosed**

FPT_TST.1/BAC TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1/BAC The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF, at the conditions:**

- 1. At Reset**

FPT_TST.1.2/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **stored TSF executable code**.

FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to:

	List of TSF data	Authorised role
Write	Document Basic Access Keys	Personalization Agent

8.1.4 Chip Authentication SFR

FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity

FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a **Chip Authentication protocol according [48]** to prove the identity of the TOE.

FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol	112	[28]

compliant to PKCS#3		
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FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3	128, 192, 256	[28]

FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946	112	[39]

FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946	128, 192, 256	[39]

FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform **hashing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
SHA1	None	[29]

FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES The TSF shall perform **hashing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards

SHA1	None	[29]
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FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform **SM encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
3DES CBC mode	112	[48]

FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES The TSF shall perform **SM encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
AES	128, 192 and 256	[48]

FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform **SM message authentication code** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
3DES Retail MAC	112	[15]

FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform **SM message authentication code** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
AES CMAC	128, 192 and 256	[48]

FIA_UAU.1/CA Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow:

1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key

4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
5. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES
6. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide

1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES

to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key

FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide

1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES

to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key

FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating

FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system.

FIA_UID.1/CA Timing of identification

FIA_UID.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow

1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit **power variations, timing variations during command execution** in excess of **non useful information** enabling access to

1. **Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)**
2. **Personalization Agent Key**

FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to

1. **Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)**
2. **Personalization Agent Key**

FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF, at the conditions:**

1. **At Reset**

FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **stored TSF executable code**.

FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the **CAK** to **Personalization Agent**.

FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the

1. **CAK**
2. **Personalization Agent Keys**

to **none**.

FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality

FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised **disclosure after Chip Authentication protocol**.

FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors **after Chip Authentication protocol**.

FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred **after Chip Authentication protocol**.

8.1.5 Terminal Authentication SFR

FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA The TSF shall perform **hashing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
SHA1, SHA256 and SHA 512	None	[29]

FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC The TSF shall perform **hashing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512	None	[29]

FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA The TSF shall perform **digital signature verification** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
RSA coupled with SHA	From 1024 to 2048, with a step of 256	[45]

FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC The TSF shall perform **digital signature verification** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
ECC coupled with SHA	From 192 to 512	[45]

FIA_UAU.4/TA Single-use authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.4.1/TA The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to

1. **Terminal Authentication Protocol**

FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UPD The TSF shall **restrict** the ability **to update** the

1. **Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key**
 2. **Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate**
- to **Country Verifying Certification Authority**.

FMT_MTD.1/TA_DATE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_DATE The TSF shall **restrict** the ability **to modify** the **Current Date** to

1. **Country Verifying Certification Authority**
2. **Document Verifier**
3. **Domestic Extended Inspection System**

FPT_TST.1/TA TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1/TA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF, at the conditions:**

- **At reset**

FPT_TST.1.2/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **stored TSF executable code**.

FMT_SMR.1/TA Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1/TA The TSF shall maintain the roles

1. **Country Verifying Certification Authority**
2. **Document Verifier**
3. **Domestic Extended Inspection System**
4. **Foreign Extended Inspection System**
5. **Manufacturer**

6. Personalization Agent

FMT_SMR.1.2/TA The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI The TSF shall **restrict** the ability **to write** the

- 1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key**
- 2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate**
- 3. Initial Current Date**

to the **Personalization Agent**

8.1.6 Extended Access Control SFR

FDP_ACC.1/EAC Subset access control

FDP_ACC.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the **EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**

FDP_ACF.1/EAC Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACF.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** to objects based on the following:

- 1. Subjects**
 - a. Personalization Agent**
 - b. Extended Inspection System**
 - c. Terminal**
- 2. Objects**
 - a. Data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**
 - b. Data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD**
 - c. Data in EF.COM**
 - d. Data in EF.SOD**
- 3. Security attributes**
 - a. Authentication status of terminals**
 - b. Terminal Authorization**

FDP_ACF.1.2/EAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- 1. The successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**
- 2. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read access to DG3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD**
- 3. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read access to DG4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD**

FDP_ACF.1.3/EAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FDP_ACF.1.4/EAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3**
- 2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4**
- 3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3**
- 4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4**
- 5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**
- 6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD**

Application Note:

Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. According to P.BAC-PP this security features of the MRTD are not subject of this protection profile.

FMT_MTD.3/EAC Secure TSF data

FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the **certificate chain** are accepted for **TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control**.

Refinement:

The Certificate chain is valid if and only if:

- 1- The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE
- 2- The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE
- 3- The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.

The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.

The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.

FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide

- 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol**
- 2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode**

to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the



1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism

FMT_LIM.1/EAC Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

1. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed (not available for BAC)

FMT_LIM.2/EAC Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

1. User Data to be disclosed

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide **the Manufacturer** with the capability to store **the IC Identification Data** in the audit records.

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization

FMT_MTD.1/ INI_ENA Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the **Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data** to the **Prepersonalizer**.

FMT_MTD.1/ INI_DIS Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to **disable read access for users to** the **Initialization Data** to the **Personalization Agent**.

8.1.7 Additional SFRs

FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE "Subset access control"

FDP_ACC.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the **UPD_FILE Access Control SFP** on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.

FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE "Basic Security attribute based access control"

FDP_ACF.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the **UPD_FILE Access Control SFP** to objects based on the following:

1. **Subjects:**
 - a. **Personalization Agent,**
 - b. **Extended Inspection System,**
 - c. **Terminal,**
2. **Objects:**
 - a. **data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**
3. **Security attributes**
 - a. **authentication status of terminals,**

FDP_ACF.1.2/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

1. **the Personalization Agent is allowed to write, read and modify the data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,**
2. **the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the name corresponding to the one (or beginning of the one) set following FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE is allowed to modify the data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.**

FDP_ACF.1.3/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FDP_ACF.1.4/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE "Management of TSF data"

FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall restrict the ability to **set the name (or beginning of the name) of the terminal allowed to modify files in phase 7, and identifiers of these files (different from EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) to the Personalization Agent.**

Application note: Name of the terminal is the Card Holder Reference (CHR) of the EIS.
Beginning of the name is a string of the left most significant bytes of the CHR of the EIS.

FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL "Management of TSF data"

FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL The TSF shall restrict the ability to **set the minimum Secure Messaging level required to access DG 3 and DG 4 to the Personalization Agent.**

Application Note: Possible secure messaging levels are: DES, AES 128, AES 192 or AES 256.

8.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirement level is EAL5+ augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5.

8.2.1 Rationale for augmentation

8.2.1.1 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures

The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD's development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD's material.

Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical measures that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE. This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (only ALC_DVS.1). Due to the nature of the TOE, there is a need for any justification of the sufficiency of these procedures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.

The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security requirements.

8.2.1.2 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Due to the definition of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks. This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component.

Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information. The attacker is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with the specific implementation of the TOE. The attacker is presumed to have a high level of technical sophistication. AVA_VAN.5 has dependencies with ADV_ARC.1 "Security architecture description", ADV_FSP.4 "Complete functional specification", ADV_IMP.1 "Implementation representation of the TSF", ADV_TDS.3 "Basic modular design", AGD_PRE.1 "Preparative procedures" and AGD_OPE.1 "Operational user Guidance" and ATE_DPT.1 "Testing: basic design".

All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.

9 TOE Summary Specification

9.1.1 TOE Summary Specification

Access Control in reading

This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.

It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:

BAC keys

Chip Authentication keys,

Active Authentication private key

Personalization Agent keys

MSK and LSK

CVCA keys

It controls access to the CPLC data as well:

It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase

It ensures it cannot be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step.

Regarding the file structure:

In the operational use:

The terminal can read user data (except DG3 & DG4), the Document Security Object, EF.CVA, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and through a valid secure channel

When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG3 & DG4 provided the access rights are sufficient through a valid secure channel

In the personalization phase:

The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).

The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique identifier is called (PUPI).

It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime

Access Control in writing

This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.

It ensures as well the CPLC data cannot be written anymore once the TOE is personalized.

Regarding the file structure:

In the operational use:

It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs.

The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application according to the authentication mechanism described in [45].

In the personalization phase

The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).

Active Authentication

This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [45]. (if it is activated by the personaliser).

EAC mechanism

This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly performed. In particular:

It handles the certificate verification

The management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration date of the incoming certificate)

The signature verification (in the certificate or in the challenge/response mechanism)

It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root CVCA key(s) the Personalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensure that the authentication is performed as described in [45].

This security functionality ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each successful Chip Authentication step.

The TOE handles an error counter; after several failures in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS (the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts.

Personalization

This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.

Physical protection

This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.

Prepersonalization

This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre-initializing the product. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.

Safe state management

This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS

a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)

This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill card" or becomes mute.

Secure Messaging

This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the communication between the TOE and the IFD.

After a successful BAC authentication, and a successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES/AES algorithms.

This security functionality ensures:

No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow

The data exchanged remain confidential

The issuer of the incoming commands and the destination of the outgoing data is the one that was authenticated (through BAC or EAC).

If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.

This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication.

This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or Personalization.

Self tests

The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data:

- At reset

9.1.2 Rationale TOE Summary Specification vs SFRs

The tables below express where the SFRs are implemented in the Security function of the TOE. The first table is dedicated to SFRs from the PP. The next table presents the additional SFRs and the last one from this chapter is dedicated to Active Authentication.

	FAU_SAS.1	FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_COP.1/SHA	FCS_COP.1/SYM	FCS_COP.1/MAC	FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER	FCS_RND.1	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.4	FIA_UAU.5	FIA_UAU.6	FIA_API.1	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_UCT.1	FDP_UIT.1	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2	FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD	FMT_MTD.1/DATE	FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	MT_MTD.1/CAPK	FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	FMT_MTD.3	FPT_EMS.1	FPT_FLS.1	FPT_TST.1	FPT_PHP.3		
Access Control in reading									X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X						X						X	X						
Access Control in writing															X				X				X		X	X	X	X	X								
Active Authentication				X				X							X	X											X		X			X					
EAC mechanism			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X							X	X					X	X					
Personalization				X				X											X													X					
Physical protection	X																				X	X														X	
Prepersonalization				X		X		X	X											X												X					
Safe state management	X																		X	X	X	X													X		
Secure Messaging		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X																								
Self tests								X																												X	

Table 27: Link between SFR from EAC PP and TSF

	FCS_COP.1/AA	FDP_DAU.1/AA	FDP_ITC.1/AA	FMT_MOF.1/AA	FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE	FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
Access Control in reading						X
Access Control in writing			X	X	X	
Active Authentication	X	X	X	X	X	X

Table 28: Link between SFR for AA and TSF

	FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE	FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE	FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE	FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL
Access Control in reading	x	x	x	x
Access Control in writing	x	x	x	x
Active Authentication				
EAC mechanism	x	x	x	
Personalization	x	x	x	x
Physical protection				
Prepersonalization	x	x	x	x
Safe state management				
Secure Messaging				
Self tests				

Table 29 : Link between TSF and SFR of the Additions: UPD_FILE and SM_LVL

10 TOE Rationales Security Objectives

10.1.1 Threats and Security Objectives

T.Read_Sensitive_Data The threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data "Read the sensitive biometric reference data" is countered by the TOE-objective **OT.Sens_Data_Conf** "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data's confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by **OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data** "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data". The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by **OE.Ext_Insp_Systems** "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".

This threat is also covered by

OT.AC_SM_Level "Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level" that enhances this protection by allowing the issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES-128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read.

T.Forgery

The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRTD's chip" addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective **OT.AC_Pers** "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. **OE.Personalization**). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective **OT.Data_Int** "Integrity of personal data" and **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** "Protection against Physical Tampering". The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to **OE.Exam_MRTD** "Examination of the MRTD passport book" and **OE.Exam_MRTD_AA** shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to **OE.Pass_Auth_Sign** "Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" and verified by the inspection system according to **OE.Pass_Auth_Verif** "Verification by Passive Authentication".

T.Counterfeit

The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD's chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip and identification and authenticity proof required by **OT.CA_Proof** "Proof of MRTD' chip authentication" using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by **OE.Auth_Key_MRTD** "MRTD Authentication Key". According to **OE.Exam_MRTD** "Examination of the MRTD passport book" the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip. **OE.Activ_Auth_Verif** covers also this threat enabling the possibility of performing an Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated to the communication.

This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip as required by **OT.AA_Proof** "Protection against forgery" and **OT.Data_Int_AA** using a authentication key pair

to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public active Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects.

T.Abuse-Func

The threat T.Abuse-Func "Abuse of Functionality" addresses attacks using the MRTD's chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by **OT.Prot_Abuse-Func** "Protection against Abuse of Functionality". Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment: **OE.Personalization** "Personalization of logical MRTD" ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.

T.Information_Leakage

The threat T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from MRTD's chip" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective **OT.Prot_Inf_Leak** "Protection against Information Leakage".

T.Phys-Tamper

The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective **OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper** "Protection against Physical Tampering".

T.Malfunction

The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective **OT.Prot_Malfunction** "Protection against Malfunctions".

T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data

The threat **T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data** "Forgery of supplemental data stored in the TOE" addresses the fraudulent alteration of **OT.UPDATE_FILE**. The TOE protects the update of these data thanks to **OT.Update_File** "Modification of file in Operational Use Phase" that ensures inspection system are authenticated and data to be updated are sent through a secure channel ensuring integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.

10.1.2 Organisational Security Policies

P.BAC-PP The OSP P.BAC-PP is directly addressed by the **OE.BAC-PP**.

P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data "Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data" is fulfilled by the TOE-objective **OT.Sens_Data_Conf** "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data's confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by **OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data** "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data". The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by **OE.Ext_Insp_Systems** "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".

This OSP is also covered by

OT.AC_SM_Level "Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level" that enhances this protection by allowing the issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES-128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read.

P.Manufact

The OSP P.Manufact "Manufacturing of the MRTD's chip" requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by **OT.Identification**.

P.Personalization

The OSP P.Personalization "Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only" addresses the:

- (i) Enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Personalization** "Personalization of logical MRTD"
- (ii) Access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective **OT.AC_Pers** "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD".

Note that the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to **OT.Identification** "Identification and Authentication of the TOE". The security objective **OT.AC_Pers** limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.

P.Activ_Auth

The OSP P.Activ_Auth requires the implementation of the Active Authentication protocol as enforced by **OT.AA_Proof**.

10.1.3 Assumptions

A.MRTD_Manufact

The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact "MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.MRTD_Manufact** "Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing" that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.

A.MRTD_Delivery

The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery "MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.MRTD_Delivery** "Protection of the MRTD delivery" that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.

A.Pers_Agent

The assumption A.Pers_Agent "Personalization of the MRTD's chip" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Personalization** "Personalization of logical MRTD" including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.

A.Insp_Sys

The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Exam_MRTD** "Examination of the MRTD passport book" which requires the inspection system to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Access Control and the General Inspection System and

Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication to verify the authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD** "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" require the Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD during the transmission and the internal handling.

A.Signature_PKI

The assumption is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Pass_Auth_Sign** "Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by **OE.Exam_MRTD** "Examination of the MRTD passport book". The threat is also covered by **OE.Activ_Auth_Sign** covering the necessary procedures for the Active Authentication key pair establishment.

A.Auth_PKI

The assumption is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data** "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data" required the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by **OE.Ext_Insp_Systems** "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems" to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.

A.Insp_Sys_AA

The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys_AA "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Exam_MRTD_AA** "Examination of the MRTD passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA** "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Active Authentication Protocol and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.

10.1.4 SPD and Security Objectives

Threats	Security Objectives
T.Read_Sensitive_Data	OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_level
T.Forgery	OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data	OT.Update_File
T.Counterfeit	OT.CA_Proof, OE.Auth_Key_MRTD, OE.Exam_MRTD, OT.AA_Proof, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif, OT.Data_Int_AA
T.Abuse-Func	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization
T.Information_Leakage	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction	OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Unauthorized_Load	OT.Secure_Load_ACode
T.Bad_Activation	OT.Secure_AC_Activation

Table 30: Threats and Security Objectives – coverage

The rational between the threats and the security objectives is presented in chapter 10.2

OSP	Security Objectives
P.BAC-PP	OE.BAC-PP
P.Sensitive_Data	OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems OT.AC_SM_Level
P.Manufact	OT.Identification
P.Personalization	OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification, OE.Personalization
P.Activ_Auth	OT.AA_Proof

Table 31: OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage

Assumptions	OE
A.MRTD_Manufact	OE.MRTD_Manufact
A.MRTD_Delivery	OE.MRTD_Delivery
A.Pers_Agent	OE.Personalization
A.Insp_Sys	OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
A.Signature_PKI	OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Pass_Auth_Verif, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
A.Auth_PKI	OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
A.Insp_Sys_AA	OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA

Table 32: Assumptions and OE – Coverage

10.2 Security requirements and security objectives

The following chapters present the rationales between security objective and security requirements.

10.2.1 Rationale Security requirements and security objectives

OT.AC_Pers

The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR **FIA_UID.1**, **FIA_UAU.1**, **FDP_ACC.1** and **FDP_ACF.1** in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR **FMT_SMR.1** lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR **FMT_SMF.1** lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR **FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE** as authentication reference data for Basic Access Control. If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the **FCS_RND.1** (for the generation of the challenge), **FCS_CKM.1**, **FCS_COP.1/SHA** (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and **FCS_COP.1/SYM** and **FCS_COP.1/MAC** (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), **FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER** (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and **FIA_UAU.6** (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the **FCS_RND.1** (for the generation of the challenge) and **FCS_COP.1/SYM** (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to **FCS_CKM.4** after use. The SFR **FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ** prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR **FPT_EMS.1** the confidentiality of these keys.

OT.Data_Int

The security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR **FDP_ACC.1** and **FDP_ACF.1** in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to **FIA_UID.1** and **FIA_UAU.1** before accessing these data. The SFR **FMT_SMR.1** lists the roles and the SFR **FMT_SMF.1** lists the TSF management functions.

The TOE supports that the inspection system. The SFR **FIA_UAU.6** and **FDP_UIT.1** requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to **FCS_CKM.1** (for the generation of shared secret), **FCS_COP.1/SHA** (for the derivation of the new session keys), and **FCS_COP.1/SYM** and **FCS_COP.1/MAC** for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to **FCS_CKM.4** after use.

The SFR **FMT_MTD.1/CAPK** and **FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ** requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.

OT.Sens_Data_Conf

The security objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data" is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in **FDP_ACC.1** and **FDP_ACF.1** allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a validly verifiable certificate according **FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER**.

The SFR **FIA_UID.1** and **FIA_UAU.1** requires the identification and authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR **FIA_UAU.5** requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication following the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented by **FIA_UAU.4**. The SFR **FIA_UAU.6** and **FDP_UCT.1** requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to **FCS_RND.1** (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), **FCS_CKM.1** (for the generation of shared secret), **FCS_COP.1/SHA** (for the derivation of the new session keys), and **FCS_COP.1/SYM** and **FCS_COP.1/MAC** for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to **FCS_CKM.4** after use. The SFR **FMT_MTD.1/CAPK** and **FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ** requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.

To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in **FMT_MTD.3** the CVCA's public key and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of **FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI**, **FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD** and **FMT_MTD.1/DATE**.

OT.Identification

The security objective OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE" addresses the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD's chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR **FAU_SAS.1**.

The SFR **FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA** allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR **FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS** allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 "Operational Use" violates the security objective OT.Identification.

OT.CA_Proof

The security objective OT.CA_Proof "Proof of MRTD's chip authenticity" is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by **FIA_API.1** proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by **FCS_CKM.1** is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by **FMT_MTD.1/CAPK** and **FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ**. The Chip Authentication Protocol [R4] requires additional TSF according to **FCS_COP.1/SHA** (for the

derivation of the session keys), **FCS_COP.1/SYM** and **FCS_COP.1/MAC** (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func

The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by **FMT_LIM.1** and **FMT_LIM.2** which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak

The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip against disclosure by:

- Measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by **FPT_EMS.1**
- Forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by **FPT_FLS.1** and **FPT_TST.1**
- Physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by **FPT_PHP.3**.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper

The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering" is covered by **FPT_PHP.3**.

OT.Prot_Malfunction

The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions" is covered by:

- **FPT_TST.1** which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code
- **FPT_FLS.1** which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.

OT.AA_Proof

The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by **FMT_MOF.1/AA** and provided by **FDP_DAU.1/AA**, **FDP_ITC.1/AA** proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on **FCS_COP.1/AA** and **FCS_RND.1**. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by **FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE** and **FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ**.

OT.Data_Int_AA

The security objective OT.Data_Int_AA is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by **FMT_MOF.1/AA** and provided by **FDP_DAU.1/AA** proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE.

OT.Update_File

The security objective **OT.Update_File** "*Modification of file in Operational Use Phase*" addresses the modification of Updatable Data as defined in **FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE**. The SFR **FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE** clarifies what can be done by which subject: after a correct authentication the Personalization Agent is allowed to write, read and modify these Updatable Data during Pre-Personalisation and Personalisation phases. Any Terminal is not allowed to modify them during Operational phase. Only a successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to modify Updatable Data, only if with the name corresponding to the one (or beginning of the one) set following **FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE** by the Personalization Agent during Pre-Personalisation and Personalisation phases.

OT.AC_SM_Level

The security objective

OT.AC_SM_Level "Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM level" is covered by **FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL**.

10.2.2 Matrix Security requirements and security objectives

SO	SFR
OT.AC_Pers	FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UAU.6, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FPT_EMS.1
OT.Data_Int	FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UIT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
OT.Sens_Data_Conf	FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.3, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE
OT.Identification	FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
OT.CA_Proof	FIA_API.1, FCS_CKM.1, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func	FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper	FPT_PHP.3
OT.Prot_Malfunction	FPT_TST.1, FPT_FLS.1
OT.AA_Proof	FMT_MOF.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ, FDP_ITC.1/AA
OT.Data_Int_AA	FMT_MOF.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA
OT.Update_File	FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE
OT.AC_SM_Level	FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL.

Table 33: Security Requirements and Security Objectives Matrix

10.2.3 Dependencies justification SFRs

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1	No dependencies	
FCS_CKM.1	(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.4	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)	FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4 See justification
FCS_COP.1/ENC	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1, See justification
FCS_COP.1/MAC	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SYM	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.1	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.1	(FIA_UID.1)	FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.5	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.6	No dependencies	
FIA_API.1	No dependencies	
FDP_ACC.1	(FDP_ACF.1)	FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE	(FDP_ACF.1)	FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1	(FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)	FDP_ACC.1 see justification
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE	(FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)	FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE see justification
FDP_UCT.1	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)	FDP_ACC.1 See justification
FDP_UIT.1	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)	FDP_ACC.1 See justification
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies	
FMT_SMR.1	(FIA_UID.1)	FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1	(FMT_LIM.2)	FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	(FMT_LIM.1)	FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DATE	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FMT_MTD.3	(FMT_MTD.1)	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
FPT_EMS.1	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies	
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies	

Table 34 - SFRs dependencies

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/AA	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FDP_ITC.1/AA, FCS_CKM.4
FDP_DAU.1/AA	No dependencies	
FDP_ITC.1/AA	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)	FDP_ACC.1 See justification
FMT_MOF.1/AA	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1

Table 35: SFRs dependencies for additional AA SFR

10.2.4 Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies

Dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is unsupported. The hash algorithm required by FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.

The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ITC.1/AA, is unsupported. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.

The dependency FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/AUTH is unsupported. FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.

The dependency **FCS_CKM.4** for FCS_COP.1/AUTH is not required since the key is permanently stored within the TOE, there is no need for key destruction.

The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1 is unsupported. FDP_UCT.1 requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.

The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1 is unsupported. FDP_UIT.1 required the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.

The dependency FTP_ITC.1 of FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA is unsupported. There is no need for FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.

The dependency of FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is not required. The access control TSF according to **FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE** uses security attributes which are defined during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.

10.2.5 SARs dependencies

Reqs	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1	(ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)	ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5	(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)	ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1	(ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)	ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2	(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)	ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4	(ADV_FSP.5)	ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1	(ADV_FSP.1)	ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1	No dependencies	
ALC_CMC.4	(ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and (ALC_LCD.1)	ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5	No dependencies	
ALC_DEL.1	No dependencies	
ALC_DVS.2	No dependencies	
ALC_LCD.1	No dependencies	
ALC_TAT.2	(ADV_IMP.1)	ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1	(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1)	ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1	No dependencies	
ASE_INT.1	No dependencies	
ASE_OBJ.2	(ASE_SPD.1)	ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2	(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2)	ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1	No dependencies	
ASE_TSS.1	(ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1)	ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2	(ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3	(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1	(ATE_COV.1)	ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2	(ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5	(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_DPT.1)	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_DPT.3

Table 36: SARs dependencies