



MRTD full EAC v2
Public Security Target BAC
FQR No: 110 7607
FQR Issue: 4

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Document Management

A. Identification

Business Unit - Department	ID R&D
Document type:	FQR
Document Title:	MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target BAC
FQR No:	110 7607
FQR Issue:	4

Table of contents

LIST OF FIGURES	8
LIST OF TABLES	9
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION	10
1.1 Purpose	10
1.2 Objective of the security target.....	10
1.3 Security target identification	11
1.4 TOE technical identification	12
1.5 IC identification.....	13
2 TOE OVERVIEW	14
2.1 Product overview	14
2.2 TOE overview	15
2.3 TOE usages.....	16
2.4 TOE definition	17
3 TOE ARCHITECTURE	19
3.1 Integrated Circuit - NXP P60.....	19
3.2 Low layer	20
3.3 Tools modules.....	21
3.4 Applicative modules.....	21
3.5 Operating System.....	22
3.6 Application layer	22
4 TOE LIFE CYCLE	23
4.1 Life cycle overview	23
4.2 Phase 1 “Development”	25
4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”	25
4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”	26
4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use”	27

5	CONFORMANCE CLAIMS	28
5.1	Common Criteria conformance	28
5.1.1	Overview of the SFR defined in this ST	29
5.1.2	Overview of the additional protocols	30
5.1.2.1	Chip Authentication	30
5.1.2.2	Active Authentication.....	30
5.1.2.3	Prepersonalization phase	30
5.2	Protection Profile conformance	31
5.3	Rationale for the additions	31
5.4	Non evaluated features	31
6	SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION	32
6.1	Subjects	32
6.1.1	PP BAC subjects.....	32
6.1.2	Additional Subjects	33
6.2	Assets	34
6.3	Threats	35
6.3.1	Threats from the PP BAC.....	35
6.3.2	Threats for CA	38
6.3.3	Threats for AA	38
6.3.4	Threats for Note 6	38
6.4	Organisational Security Policies	39
6.4.1	OSP from PP BAC.....	39
6.4.2	OSP for CA	40
6.4.3	OSP for AA	40
6.5	Assumptions	40
6.5.1	Assumptions from PP BAC	40
6.5.2	Assumptions for Chip Authentication	41
6.5.3	Assumptions for Active Authentication	42
7	SECURITY OBJECTIVES	43
7.1	Security Objectives for the TOE	43
7.1.1	SO from PP BAC.....	43
7.1.2	SO for CA	44

7.1.3	SO for AA.....	45
7.1.4	SO for Note 6.....	45
7.2	Security objectives for the Operational Environment.....	46
7.2.1	OE from PP BAC.....	46
7.2.1.1	Issuing State or Organization	46
7.2.1.2	Receiving State or Organization	48
7.2.2	OE for CA.....	48
7.2.3	OE for AA.....	49
8	EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS	51
8.1	Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage.....	51
8.1.1	Extended components FAU_SAS.1.....	51
8.2	Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers	51
8.2.1	Extended component FCS_RND.1.....	51
8.3	Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity	51
8.3.1	Extended component FIA_API.1	51
8.4	Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability.....	52
8.4.1	Extended component FMT_LIM.1.....	52
8.4.2	Extended component FMT_LIM.2.....	52
8.5	Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation	53
8.5.1	Extended component FPT_EMS.1.....	53
9	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS	54
9.1	Security Functional Requirements.....	54
9.1.1	Global SFR	54
9.1.2	Product configuration SFR	56
9.1.2.1	SFR for additional code	56
9.1.2.2	Manufacturing and Personalization	59
9.1.3	Active Authentication SFR.....	67
9.1.4	Basic Access Control SFR.....	69
9.1.4.1	Common Basic Access Control SFR.....	69
9.1.4.2	Specific Basic Access Control SFR	72
9.1.5	Chip Authentication SFR.....	75
9.2	Security Assurance Requirements	81

10	TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION	82
10.1	TOE Summary Specification	82
11	RATIONALES	85
12	REFERENCES	86
13	ACRONYMS	89
	INDEX	90

List of Figures

Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview	15
Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview	15
Figure 3 - TOE architecture	19
Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE	23

List of tables

Table 1 - General Identification	11
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification	12
Table 3 - Chip Identification	13
Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview	15
Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library	20
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle	24
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps	24
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale	28
Table 9 -SFR from the PP	29
Table 10 - Additional SFR	30
Table 11 - User Data	34
Table 12 - TSF Data	35
Table 13- Threats and Security Objectives – coverage	85
Table 14 - OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage	85
Table 15 - Assumptions and OE – Coverage	85

1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The objective of this document is to present the Public Security Target BAC of the MRTD full EAC v2 product on NXP components from P60 family.

1.2 Objective of the security target

This security target describes the security needs for MRTD full EAC v2 product. The product is conforming to PP BAC and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization.

This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL4 augmented as defined in §1.3 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the environment in which it operates.

The objectives of this Security Target are:

- To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life cycle.
- To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases.
- To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during the product active phases.
- To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment.
- To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements.
- To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.

1.3 Security target identification

Title:	Security target BAC
Editor:	Oberthur Technologies
CC version:	3.1 revision 4
EAL:	EAL4 augmented with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4 - ALC_DVS.2, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 - ATE_DPT.3
PP(s):	BSI-CC-PP-055 [R11]
ST Reference:	FQR 110 7216 Issue 11
ITSEF:	LETI
Certification Body:	ANSSI
Evaluation scheme:	FR

Table 1 - General Identification

1.4 TOE technical identification

Product name:	ID-One ePass Full EAC v2
Commercial name of the TOE 1:	ID-One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x080 VC/VG in BAC configuration with AA and CA
Commercial name of the TOE 2:	ID-One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x144 VA in BAC configuration with AA and CA
IC type	'6C14' (P60D080 VC) '6014' (P60D080 VG) '6A15' (P60D144 VA) '6019' (P60C080 VG) '6A20' (P60C144 VA)
Additional code 1 Mandatory generic Identification:	'C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B0986F7A738'
Additional code 2 Optional DBI Identification:	'B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606532F51C2'

Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification

Nota Bene

- The additional code doesn't depend on the IC and the memory size
- The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key
- An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the evaluation.

1.5 IC identification

IC Reference:	NXP P60 chips
TOE 1:	NXP P60x080/052/040 PVC/PVG [R19] EAL 6 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ASE_TSS.2
TOE 2:	NXP P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) [R18] EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1
Communication protocol:	Contact, Contactless and Dual
Memory:	ROM
Chip Manufacturer:	NXP Semiconductors

Table 3 - Chip Identification

Nota Bene

TOE 1 and TOE 2 possess the same source code, which is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two NXP chips are driven from the NXP P60 chip family.

2 TOE OVERVIEW

2.1 Product overview

The product **ID-One Native eDoc** is a multi-applicative native software, embeddable in contact and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the **Prepersonalization/personalization phases** of the product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST.

The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data Structure as specified in **[R2]**. It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic Access Control **[R11]**, Supplementary Access Control **[R17]**, Extended Access Control (**[R12]** and **[R13]**), the Basic Access Protection **[R9]** and Extended Access Protection (compliant to **[R9]**).

It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL, **MRTD**, eID and eSign. Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases other than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents.

This product is embedded on the ICs described in §1.5 IC identification.

The **ID-One Native eDoc** architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture:




Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview

2.2 TOE overview

The TOE described in this security target is the BAC TOE of the product, a subset of the Block 1 MRTD - IDL.

The block 1 of the ID-One Native eDoc is composed of the following applications:

Applications	PP	Targeted EAL
BAC with CA and AA	[R11]	EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3
EAC with BAC and AA	[R12]	EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
EAC with PACE	[R13]	EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
PACE	[R14]	EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
BAP	X	EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3
EAC and BAP	X	EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
PACE	X	EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
PACE and EAC	X	EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5

Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview




Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview

The BAC TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the operating system that creates the MF / DF required for the BAC configuration.

The TOE life cycle is described in §4 TOE life cycle.

The TOE identification is described in §1.4 TOE technical identification.

Nota bene

The TOE scope encompasses the following features:

- Basic Access Control
- Active Authentication
- Chip Authentication
- Prepersonalization phase

Nevertheless, the TOE can embed other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs.

2.3 TOE usages

State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.

In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field.

The MRTD in context of this security target contains:

- Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet
- A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area)
- And data elements stored on the TOE's chip for contact-less machine reading.

The authentication of the holder is based on:

- The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and
- The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored in the MRTD.

When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as “visa information”...

The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.

The MRTD can be viewed as the combination:

- **A physical MRTD** in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
 - o The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book
 - o The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the device
 - o The printed portrait
- **A logical MRTD** as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO and extended in **[R7], [R8], [R9]** on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
 - o The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1)
 - o The digitized portraits
 - o The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
 - o The other data according to LDS (up to DG24)
 - o The Document security object

The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD's chip is uniquely identified by the document number.

The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD's chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the MRTD's chip to the physical support.

The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD's chip.

2.4 TOE definition

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to 'ICAO Doc 9303'.

The TOE comprises at least:

- Circuitry of the MRTD's chip (the integrated circuit, IC)

- IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software
- IC Embedded Software (operating system)
- MRTD application
- Associated guidance documentation

3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components:




Figure 3 - TOE architecture

3.1 Integrated Circuit - NXP P60

The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in **Table 3 - Chip Identification**. More information on the chips are given in the related security targets.

3.2 Low layer

The low layer developed by Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.

The main features of the OS are the following:

- EEPROM management including secure data processing,
- Other memories management,
- Transaction management,
- APDU protocol management,
- Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management,
- Error processing,
- Advanced securities activation.

A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:

Cryptographic Feature	Embedded
SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 bits	✓
RSA CRT from 1024, to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits): - signature/verification - key pair generation	✓
RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits): - signature/verification - key pair generation	✓
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits : - signature/verification (ECDSA) - key agreement (ECDH) - key pair generation	✓
3DES with 112 bits key size	✓
AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes	✓
Random Generator compliant AIS31	✓
Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 : - key agreement - key generation	✓
Integrated mapping over prime field and Elliptic curves	✓

Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library

More information is available in complete ST.

3.3 Tools modules

The tools modules provide MRTD full EAC v2 product:

- File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-9. It is also compliant with ICAO recommendations **[R2]**.
- ISO Secure Messaging as specified in **[R20]** and as described in annex E of **[R41]**.
- PIN and BIO access rights management as presented in § 2.5 of **[R40]** and B.6 of **[R41]**
- Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation.
- Symmetric Key management
- Access Control for 'Change MSK' and 'PUT KEY' APDU
- Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard

More information is available in complete ST.

3.4 Applicative modules

The applicative modules provide MRTD full EAC v2 product:

- Chip Authentication version 1 as described in **[R39]** and version 2 as described in **[R40]**, an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
- Terminal Authentication version 1 as described in **[R39]** and version 2 as described in **[R40]**, a two move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the terminal.
- PACE Protocol as specified in **[R17]**, a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password-based authentication of the MRTD chip and the terminal.
- Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID...). For applications already defined by normative documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access condition rules.
- Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. This module is part of the TOE and outside the scope of this present certification.

More information is available in complete ST.

3.5 Operating System

This application manages the TOE in pre-personalization and personalization phases in order to configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK, LSK), File management including data reading and writing or additional code loading. It can be addressed in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands, using SCP02 or SCP03.

More information is available in complete ST.

3.6 Application layer

Two kinds of dispatcher are available on the top of the product: the resident application that is used for Personalization Phase and for administration during Use Phase and the eDoc application that is used during the Use Phase of MRTD Applications.

The application layer also manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access Control or Active Authentication. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2]. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD's data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.

The inspection system:

- Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),
- Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data.

After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.

The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD's data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.

More information is available in complete ST.

4 TOE LIFE CYCLE

4.1 Life cycle overview




Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE

The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the [R10], the TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)

Additional codes are identified in §1.5.

The table below presents the TOE role:

Roles	Subject
IC developer	NXP Semiconductors
IC manufacturer	NXP Semiconductors
TOE developer	Oberthur Technologies
Manufacturer	NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Prepersonalizer	Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Personalization Agent	Oberthur Technologies or another agent

Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle

The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [R10], the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the coverage:

Steps	Phase	Subject	Covered by	Sites
Step 1	Development	Oberthur Technologies	ALC R&D sites	Pessac and Colombes
Step 2	Development	NXP Semiconductors	IC certification	IC certification
Step 3	Manufacturing	NXP Semiconductors	IC certification	IC certification
TOE delivery point				
Step 4	Manufacturing	MRD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer)	AGD_PRE	
Step 5	Manufacturing	MRD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer)	AGD_PRE	
Step 6	Personalization	Personalization Agent	AGD_PRE	
Step 7	Operational Use	End user	AGD_OPE	

Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps

4.2 Phase 1 “Development”

(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the eMRTD application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer.

4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”

(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the *delivery process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer.* If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer add initialization data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK).

TOE delivery point

(Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only.

(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source code in the non-volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.

The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.

Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6 [R45].

The additional code loading process is performed by the Prepersonalizer in the following steps, via the Command LOAD SECURE:

- Additional code generation
- MSK authentication
- LSK derivation
- Memory area definition
- Loading of the additional code
- Secure activation of the additional code

The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during Prepersonalization.

Identification of the additional code loading is given in Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification.

Additional code generation

The additional code is generated by Oberthur Technologies: developed, compiled, ciphered and signed. After generation, it is sent to the MRTD manufacturer so that it can load it in the (initial) TOE.

Loading of the additional code

The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (initial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it.

Identification of the TOE

After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE updates its identification data to reflect the presence of the additional code.

4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”

(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data

(i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.

4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use”

(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.

Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.

5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

5.1 Common Criteria conformance

This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R42], [R43] and [R44].

The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:

CC	Conformance rationale
Part 1	Strict conformance
Part 2	Conformance to the extended ¹ part: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FAU_SAS.1 "Audit Storage" - FCS_RND.1 "Quality metric for random numbers" - FMT_LIM.1 "Limited capabilities" - FMT_LIM.2 "Limited availability" - FPT_EMS.1 "TOE Emanation" - FIA_API.1 "Authentication Proof of Identity"
Part 3	Strict conformance to Part 3. The product claims conformance to EAL 4, augmented ² with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ALC_DVS.2 "Sufficiency of security measures" - ADV_FSP.5 "Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information" - ADV_INT.2 "Well-structured internals" - ADV_TDS.4 "Semiformal modular design" - ALC_CMS.5 "Development tools CM coverage" - ALC_TAT.2 "Compliance with implementation standards" - ATE_DPT.3 "Testing: modular design"

Table 8 - Conformance Rationale

Remark

For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may

¹ The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP

² This EAL and its augmentations correspond to an EAL5+ALC_DVS.2 where AVA_VAN level is downgraded to AVA_VAN.3 following constraint of [R10] about MRZ/keydoc entropy

protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).

FPT_EMSEC.1 from the Protection Profile has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep the SFR formatting.

FIA_API.1 has been added to this security target for the needs of the Chip Authentication Protocol, that is described in the PP EAC.

5.1.1 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST

SFR are presented in § 9.1 Security Functional Requirements:

- SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE)
- SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading
- SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases
- SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication
- SFR (/BAC) that are dedicated for Basic Access Control
- SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication

The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation.

SFR from the PP
FAU_SAS.1 ; FCS_CKM.1 ; FCS_CKM.4 ; FCS_COP.1/SHA ; FCS_COP.1/SYM ; FCS_COP.1/MAC ; FCS_RND.1 ; FIA_UID.1 ; FIA_UAU.1 ; FIA_UAU.4 ; FIA_UAU.5 ; FIA_UAU.6 ; FIA_AFL.1 ; FDP_ACC.1 ; FDP_ACF.1 ; FDP_UCT.1 ; FDP_UIT.1 ; FMT_SMF.1 ; FMT_SMR.1 ; FMT_LIM.1 ; FMT_LIM.2 ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ; FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ; FPT_EMS.1 ; FPT_FLS.1 ; FPT_TST.1 ; FPT_PHP.3

Table 9 -SFR from the PP

Section	Additional SFR
MP	FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ; FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.4/MP ; FIA_UAU.5/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP ; FTP_ITC.1/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
MP Add code	FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FDP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_COP.1/MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code
Active Authentication	FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ; FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE

Section	Additional SFR
Chip Authentication	FIA_API.1/CA ; FSC_CKM.1/CA ; FCS_COP.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.1/CA ; FIA_UAU.5/CA ; FIA_UAU.6/CA ; FIA_UID.1/CA ; FPT_TST.1/CA ; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ ; FDP_UCT.1/CA ; FDP_UIT.1/CA

Table 10 - Additional SFR

5.1.2 Overview of the additional protocols

5.1.2.1 Chip Authentication

The Chip Authentication has been added to this Security Target in order to reinforce the BAC authentication mechanism by ensuring the verification of the Card by the Terminal. For this addition, the TOE SPD has been refined and contains the following additions:

- Additional Threats: **§ 6.3.2 Threats for CA**
- Additional Objective: **§ 7.1.2 SO for CA**
- Additional OE: **§ 7.2.2 OE for CA**

5.1.2.2 Active Authentication

The additional functionality of Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys.

It implies the following addition to the standard PP:

- Additional Threats: **§ 6.3.3 Threats for AA**
- Additional Objective: **§ 7.1.3 SO for AA**
- Additional OE: **§ 7.2.3 OE for AA**

5.1.2.3 Prepersonalization phase

The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following elements.

This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. The following addition has been performed:

- Additional Threats: **§ 6.3.4 Threats for Note 6**
- Additional Objective: **§ 7.1.4 SO for Note 6**

The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 [R45].

5.2 Protection Profile conformance

The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2:

- Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control [R11].

5.3 Rationale for the additions

The rationales are available in the complete ST.

5.4 Non evaluated features

Some features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs:

- Standard and biometric PIN management
- File system management
- PACE
- DBI

The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign,The current evaluation covers any combination of application.

Last but not least, the TOE may also contain PACE together with BAC. PACE allows the terminal to gain access to the TOE and its assets in the same manner as BAC, but resists to attacker with high potential, unlike BAC (that only resists to attacker with moderate potential).

Strictly speaking, as PACE affects the TSF (access control policies,...) it should be included in the evaluation. However, the evaluation of PACE will be fully performed through the evaluation of another configuration of the TOE claiming conformance with [R30]. Therefore, PACE is considered as being part of the TOE as non evaluated feature.

6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

6.1 Subjects

6.1.1 PP BAC subjects

Manufacturer

The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD's chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.

Personalization Agent

The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [R2].

Application Note

Personalization Agent is referred as the Personalizer in the Security Target

Terminal

A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.

Inspection System (IS)

A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD's chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the

Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.

Application Note

This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the Extended Access Control is outside the scope.

MRTD Holder

The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.

Traveler

Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.

Attacker

A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD's chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.

Application Note

An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.

6.1.2 Additional Subjects

IC Developer

Developer of the IC.

TOE Developer

Developer of part of the TOE source code.

Prepersonalizer

Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as described in [R11].

6.2 Assets

Logical MRTD data

The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (CAPK) in EF.DG 14 is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.

The Active Authentication Public Key (AAPK) Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Active Authentication of the chip.

All these data may be sorted out in two different categories:

- If they are specific to the user, they are User data
- If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data.

User Data	Description
CPLC Data	Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder
Personal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DGx, except EF.DG15)	Contains identification data of the holder
Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD	Contain a certificate ensuring the integrity of the file stored within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data are issued by a genuine country
Common data in EF.COM	Declare the data the travel document contains. This data is optional and may be absent in the TOE
Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 (AAPK)	Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an Active Authentication
Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14 (CAPK)	Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an the Chip Authentication Protocol

Table 11 - User Data

TSF Data	Description
TOE_ID	Data enabling to identify the TOE
Prepersonalizer reference authentication data	Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer
Personalization Agent reference authentication Data	Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization Agent
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key	Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
Active Authentication private key (AAK)	Private key the chip uses to perform an Active Authentication
Chip Authentication private key (CAK)	Private key the chip uses to perform a Chip Authentication

TSF Data	Description
Session keys for the secure channel	Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
Life Cycle State	Life Cycle state of the TOE
Additional Code	Additional code to be loaded on the initial TOE during prepersonalization by the Prepersonalizer. The loading of the additional code on the initial TOE constitutes the final TOE

Table 12 - TSF Data

Authenticity of the MRTD's chip

The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.

6.3 Threats

This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.

6.3.1 Threats from the PP BAC

T.Chip_ID

Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD's chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance

Asset: Anonymity of user

T.Skimming

Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.

T.Eavesdropping

Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD's chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.

T.Forgery

Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder's identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD's chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs.

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.

T.Abuse-Func

Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.

This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Information_Leakage

Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal

operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.

T.Phys-Tamper

Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD's chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD's chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD's chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.

The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD's chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD's chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Malfunction

Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD's chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD's chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

6.3.2 Threats for CA

T.Counterfeit

Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data

6.3.3 Threats for AA

T.Counterfeit

6.3.4 Threats for Note 6

T.Unauthorized_Load

Adverse action: An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: Logical MRTD data

T.Bad_Activation

Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is different than the expected one (initial TOE or perturbed TOE).

Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD, being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be load

Asset: Logical MRTD data

T.TOE_Identification_Forgery

Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional code identification.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: TOE_ID

Application Note

This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7.

6.4 Organisational Security Policies

6.4.1 OSP from PP BAC

P.Manufact

The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.

P.Personalization

The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.

P.Personal_Data

The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD's chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD's chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD's chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic

Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [R11].

6.4.2 OSP for CA

P.Chip_Auth

The terminal implements the Chip Authentication protocol as described in [R39].

6.4.3 OSP for AA

P.Activ_Auth

The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [R39].

6.5 Assumptions

The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used.

6.5.1 Assumptions from PP BAC

A.MRTD_Manufact

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

A.MRTD_Delivery

Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:

- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.

A.Pers_Agent

The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD's chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD's chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.

A.Insp_Sys

The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.

A.BAC-Keys

The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.

6.5.2 Assumptions for Chip Authentication

A.Insp_Sys_CA

The Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.

A.Signature_PKI

The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States

maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.

6.5.3 Assumptions for Active Authentication

A.Insp_Sys_AA

The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.

7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.

7.1.1 SO from PP BAC

OT.AC_Pers

The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.

OT.Data_Int

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.

OT.Data_Conf

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.

OT.Identification

The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func

After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip:

- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper

The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of

- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)

with a prior

- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

OT.Prot_Malfunction

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.

7.1.2 SO for CA

OT.CA_Proof

The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip Authentication as defined in [R39]. The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

Application note

The objective implies the MRTD's to have (i) a unique identity as given by the MRTD's Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD's chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD's chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [R2] and (ii) the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.

OT.Data_Int_CA

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.

7.1.3 SO for AA

OT.AA_Proof

The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [R2]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

OT.Data_Int_AA

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication.

7.1.4 SO for Note 6

OT.Secure_Load_ACode

The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE.

During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure.

OT.Secure_AC_Activation

Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation.

If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state or fail secure.

OT.TOE_Identification

The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Additional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity.

7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment

7.2.1 OE from PP BAC

7.2.1.1 Issuing State or Organization

The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.MRTD_Manufact

Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.

During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.

OE.MRTD_Delivery

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:

- non-disclosure of any security relevant information
- identification of the element under delivery
- meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment)
- physical protection to prevent external damage
- secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE"s)
- traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 - o origin and shipment details
 - o reception, reception acknowledgement
 - o location material/information.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.

Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.

OE.Personalization

The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.

OE.Pass_Auth_Sign

The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [R2].

OE.BAC-Keys

The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.

7.2.1.2 Receiving State or Organization

The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.Exam_MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2].

OE.Passive_Auth_Verif

The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).

7.2.2 OE for CA

OE.Auth_Key_MRTD

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to:

- (i) Generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair
- (ii) Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14
- (iii) Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

OE.Exam_MRTD_CA

Additionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Chip Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA

Additionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.

Application note

The Inspection Systems follow the order (i) running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Object and Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD after Chip Authentication. The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are protected by secure messaging with cryptographic keys based on the Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol. Note that reading the less sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this PP. But the TOE ensures that reading of sensitive data is possible after successful Chip Authentication.

7.2.3 OE for AA

OE.Exam_MRTD_AA

Additionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA

Additionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active Authentication Protocol.

OE.Activ_Auth_Verif

In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.

OE.Activ_Auth_Sign

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRTD's Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD's Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS

8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage

8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1

Description: see [R11].

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: see [R11]

8.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers

8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1

Description: see [R11]

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: See [R11]

8.3 Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity

8.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1

Description: see [R12]

FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: See [R12]

8.4 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability

8.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1

Description: see [R11]

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)

Rationale: See [R11]

8.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2

Description: See [R11]

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)

Rationale: See [R11]

8.5 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation

8.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1

Description: see [R11]

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: See [R11]

9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

9.1 Security Functional Requirements

This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements:

- **Global SFR** that are applicable to all the passports configuration
- **MP SFR** for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code.
- **Active Authentication SFR** that cover the Active Authentication Protocol
- **BAC SFR** that cover the Basic Access Control
- **CA SFR** that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol

9.1.1 Global SFR

This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are embedded on the product.

FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **zeroisation** that meets the following: **none**.

FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet

1. The requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31 [R37] and
2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation.

FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated

3. Software to be reconstructed

4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks

FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

1. User Data to be manipulated

2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated

3. Software to be reconstructed

4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks

FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit **power variations, timing variations during command execution** in excess of **non useful information** enabling access to

1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16

FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to

1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16

FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state

FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur

2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.

FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF, at the conditions:**

- **At reset**
- **Before any cryptographic operation**
- **When accessing a DG or any EF**

- Prior to any use of TSF data
- Before execution of any command

FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.

FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.

FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack

FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist **physical manipulation and physical probing** to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

9.1.2 Product configuration SFR

This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the compliance to Note 6.

9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code

FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code Guarantees of audit data availability

FAU_STG.2.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.

FAU_STG.2.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to **prevent** unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

FAU_STG.2.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure that **Additional code identification** stored audit records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: **failure and attack**.

Application Note:

Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is verified by the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the TOE life cycle, at each power on, the card verifies the integrity of this signature.

FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data entered - AES 128 ECB	128	None

FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_Add_code Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [**cryptographic operation**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Encryption of the additional code (ciphered with LSK_LOAD) and signature verification	AES	128	[R35]

FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [**cryptographic operation**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging with BAC - 3DES	3DES Retail MAC	112	[R35]
Secure Messaging with BAC - AES	AES CMAC	128, 192 or 256	[R35]

FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization access control SFP** to **receive** user data in a manner protected from **modification** errors.

FDP_UIT.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification of some of the pieces of the application sent by the TOE developer** has occurred.

Application Note

Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the card to be different from the one sent by the TOE Developer.

This SFR control integrity of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.

FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the [list of TSF data] to [authorized identified roles]:

	List of TSF data	Authorised role
Activate	Additional code	TOE developer

Application note

The Activation of the additional code modify the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and activated after the authentication of the TOE developer.

FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the [data] to [authorized identified roles]:

TSF Data	Authorized Identified roles
LSK	None

FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall maintain the roles

1. TOE developer

FMT_SMR.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/MP_Add_code The TOE shall not emit **power variations, timing variations during command execution** in excess of **non useful information** enabling access to

1. LSK

FPT_EMS.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to

1. LSK

FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code Inter-TSF trusted channel

FTP_ITC.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall permit **the TOE Developer and Prepersonalizer** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for:

1. Additional code loading

9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization

FCS_CKM.1/MP Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256	256	None

FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption	3DES in CBC mode	112	[R32]

FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption	AES in CBC mode	128, 192 and 256	[R35]

FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging – MAC	3DES RMAC	112	[R32]

FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging MAC	AES	128, 192 and 256	[R35]

FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK)	3DES	112	[R32]

FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK)	AES	128, 192 and 256	[R35]

FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MP_SHA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Hashing	SHA256	None	[R27]

FDP_ACC.2/MP Complete access control

FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization Access Control** on **all subjects and all objects** and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

Application Note

This SFR enforces access control over all the operation performed in phase 5, including additional code loading but not only.

FDP_ACF.1/MP Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization Access Control** to objects based on the following **Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS)**.

FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE)**.

FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

Application Note

This SFR enforces access control over all the operation in phase 5, including additional code loading but not only.

FDP_ITC.1/MP Import of user data without security attributes

FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization access control** when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: **none**.

Application Note

This SFR control import of data in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.

This SFR ensures also the MSK diversification, which is performed once, at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action.

FDP_UCT.1/MP Basic data exchange confidentiality

FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization access control to receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

Application note

For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. This SFR control confidentiality of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.

FDP_UIT.1/MP Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization Access Control SFP to receive** user data in a manner protected from **modification** errors

FDP_UIT.1.2/MP [Editorially refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer** has occurred

FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling

FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when **3** unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to **authentication of**

1. Prepersonalizer

FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been **met**, the TSF shall **forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer**.

FIA_UAU.1/MP Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow **GET DATA, SELECT FILE** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UID.1/MP Timing of identification

FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow **GET DATA, SELECT FILE** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES Single-use authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to

1. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES

FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES Single-use authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_AES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to

1. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES

FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall provide

1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES

to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key

FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_AES The TSF shall provide

1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES
to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key

FMT_MTD.1/MP Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall **restrict** the ability **to switch** the **TOE life cycle from phase 5 to phase 6 to the Prepersonalizer.**

FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel

FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2/MP [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall permit **the Prepersonalizer** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for:

1. Personalization Agent key storage
2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase

FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA The TSF shall **restrict** the ability **to write** the **Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer.**

FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS The TSF shall **restrict** the ability to **disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent**.

FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the [data] to [authorized identified roles]:

TSF Data	Authorized Identified roles
MSK	None
Personalization Agent Keys	None

FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the [data] to [authorized identified roles]:

TSF Data	Authorized Identified roles
MSK	IC manufacturer (created by the developer)
Personalization Agent Keys	None

FAU_SAS.1/MP Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide **the Manufacturer** with the capability to store **the IC Identification Data** in the audit records.

FMT_SMF.1/MP Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1/MP The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization

FMT_SMR.1/MP Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1/MP The TSF shall maintain the roles

1. Manufacturer

FMT_SMR.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FPT_EMS.1/MP TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/MP The TOE shall not emit **power variations, timing variations during command execution** in excess of **non useful information** enabling access to

1. Prepersonalizer Key
2. Personalization Agent Key
3. MSK

FPT_EMS.1.2/MP The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to

1. Prepersonalizer Key
2. Personalization Agent Key
3. MSK

9.1.3 Active Authentication SFR

FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform [**cryptographic operation**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Operation	Algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standard
Digital Signature Creation	RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512	1024 to 4096 with a step of 256 bits	[R25]

FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform **[cryptographic operation]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[cryptographic algorithm]** and cryptographic key sizes **[cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following **[standard]**:

Operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Digital Signature Creation	ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512	192 to 521 over prime field curves	[R25] [R26] [R27] [R28]

FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication

FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of **the TOE itself**.

FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide **any users** with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.

Refinement:

Evidence generation and ability of verifying it, constitute the Active Authentication protocol.

FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes

FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the **Active Authentication Access Control SFP** when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: **none**.

FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the **AAK** to **none**.

FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit **power variations, timing variations during command execution** in excess of **non useful information** enabling access to

- 1. **Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)**

FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to

- 1. **Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)**

FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour

FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to **disable and enable** the functions **TSF Active Authentication** to **Personalization Agent**.

FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the **AAK** to **Personalization Agent**.

9.1.4 Basic Access Control SFR

9.1.4.1 Common Basic Access Control SFR

FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm	112	[R2]

FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_AUTH The TSF shall perform **[cryptographic operation]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[cryptographic algorithm]** and cryptographic key sizes **[cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following **[standard]**:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Symmetric authentication, encryption and decryption	3DES	112	[R35]

FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA The TSF shall perform **[cryptographic operation]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[cryptographic algorithm]** and cryptographic key sizes **[cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following **[standard]**:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Hashing	SHA1	None	[R27]

FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC The TSF shall perform **[cryptographic operation]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[cryptographic algorithm]** and cryptographic key sizes **[cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following **[standard]**:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging (BAC) – encryption and decryption	3DES in CBC mode	112	[R35][R32]

FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC The TSF shall perform **[cryptographic operation]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[cryptographic algorithm]** and cryptographic key sizes **[cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following **[standard]**:

Cryptographic operation	Algo	Key length (bits)	Standard
Secure Messaging MAC	Retail MAC	112	[R32]

FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality

FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from **modification, deletion, insertion and replay** errors

FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification, deletion, insertion and replay** has occurred

FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the [data] to [authorized identified roles]:

TSF Data	Authorized Identified roles
Document Access Keys	None

FMT_LIM.1/BAC Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

1. User Data to be disclosed

FMT_LIM.2/BAC Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

1. User Data to be disclosed

FPT_TST.1/BAC TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1/BAC The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF, at the conditions:**

- **When performing a BAC authentication**

FPT_TST.1.2/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data.**

FPT_TST.1.3/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **stored TSF executable code.**

FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the [list of TSF data] to [authorized identified roles]:

	List of TSF data	Authorised role
Write	Document Basic Access Keys	Personalization Agent

9.1.4.2 Specific Basic Access Control SFR

FDP_ACC.1/BAC Complete access control

FDP_ACC.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Control SFP** on **terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16** and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

FDP_ACF.1/BAC Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACF.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Control SFP** to objects based on the following:

1. Subjects:

- a. **Personalization Agent**
- b. **Basic Inspection System**
- c. **Terminal**

2. Objects:

- a. **data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**
- b. **data in EF.COM**
- c. **data in EF.SOD**

3. Security attributes:

- a. **authentication status of terminals**

FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**
- 2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**

FDP_ACF.1.3/BAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**
- 2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**
- 3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4..**

FMT_SMR.1/BAC Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1/BAC The TSF shall maintain the roles

1. Basic Inspection System

FMT_SMR.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FIA_AFL.1/BAC Authentication failure handling

FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC The TSF shall detect when an **administrator configurable positive integer within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive** unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to BAC authentication protocol

FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been **met or surpassed** the TSF shall **wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the BAC authentication attempts**

FIA_UAU.6/BAC Re-authenticating

FIA_UAU.6.1/BAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions **each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism**

FIA_UID.1/BAC Timing of identification

FIA_UID.1.1/BAC The TSF shall allow

1. **To read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”**
2. **To read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”**
3. **To read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”**

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2/BAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user

FIA_UAU.1/BAC Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1/BAC The TSF shall allow

1. **To read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”**
2. **To read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”**
3. **To read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operationa Use”**

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2/BAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.4/BAC Single-use authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.4.1/BAC The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to

1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism

FIA_UAU.5/BAC Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/BAC The TSF shall provide

1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism

to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/BAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys

9.1.5 Chip Authentication SFR

FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity

FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a **Chip Authentication protocol according to [R39]** to prove the identity of the **TOE**.

FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3	112	[R2]

FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3	128, 192, 256	[R2]

FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946	112	[R2]

FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**cryptographic key generation algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic key generation algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946	128, 192, 256	[R2]

FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform **hashing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length	Standards
-------------------------	------------	-----------

	(bits)	
SHA1	None	[R27]

FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES The TSF shall perform **hashing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
SHA1 and SHA256	None	[R27]

FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform **SM encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
3DES CBC mode	112	[R27]

FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES The TSF shall perform **SM encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
AES	128, 192 and 256	[R27]

FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform **SM message authentication code** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
3DES Retail MAC	112	[R39]

FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation

FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform **SM message authentication code** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**key length**] that meet the following [**standard**]:

Cryptographic algorithm	Key length (bits)	Standards
AES CMAC	128, 192 and 256	[R39]

FDP_ITC.1/CA Import of user data without security attributes

FDP_ITC.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the **Chip Authentication Access Control SFP** when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.2/CA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.3/CA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: **none**.

FIA_UAU.1/CA Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow:

1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key

4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide

- 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode**
 - 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES**
- to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

- 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism**

FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide

- 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode**
 - 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES**
- to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

- 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism**

FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating

FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions **each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system**

FIA_UID.1/CA Timing of identification

FIA_UID.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow

1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit **power variations, timing variations during command execution** in excess of **non useful information** enabling access to

1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)

FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to

1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)

FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF, at the conditions:**

- **When performing the Chip Authentication**

FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **stored TSF executable code**.

FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the **CAK** to **Personalization Agent**.

FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the **CAK** to **none**.

FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality

FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure **after Chip Authentication protocol**.

FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from **modification, deletion, insertion and replay** errors **after Chip Authentication protocol**

FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification, deletion, insertion and replay** has occurred **after Chip Authentication protocol**

9.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirement level is EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3.

10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

10.1 TOE Summary Specification

Access Control in reading

This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.

It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:

- BAC keys
- Chip Authentication keys,
- Active Authentication private key
- Personalization Agent keys
- MSK and LSK

It controls access to the CPLC data as well:

- It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase
- It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step

Regarding the file structure:

In the operational use:

- The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and through a valid secure channel.

In the personalization phase

- The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).

It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime

Access Control in writing

This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.

It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it is not possible to load an additional code.

Regarding the file structure

In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However

- the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs

In the personalization phase

- The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).

Active Authentication

This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [R39]. (if it is activated by the personalizer).

BAC mechanism

This security functionality ensures the BAC is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the symmetric BAC keys the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the session keys are destroyed at the end of each BAC session.

Chip Authentication

This security functionality ensures the Chip Authentication is performed as described in [R39] (if it is activated by the personalizer). It could be used as an alternative of Active Authentication to reinforce the Authentication of the Chip. It differs from an EAC not performing the Terminal Authentication.

Personalization

This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.

Physical protection

This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.

Prepersonalization

This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre-initializing the product and loading additional code if needed. This TSF is conformant with [R45]. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.

Safe state management

This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when

- an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
- a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)

This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill card" or becomes mute.

Secure Messaging

This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the communication between the TOE and the IFD. After a successful BAC authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES/AES algorithms.

This security functionality ensures

- No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow
- The data exchanged remain confidential

If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.

This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication.

This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or Personalization.

Self tests

The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data:

- Before the TSF data usage
- The additional code integrity is checked at each POWER ON of the card
- The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured

11 RATIONALES

Threats	Security Objectives
T.Chip_ID	OT.Identification , OE.BAC-Keys , OT.TOE_Identification
T.Skimming	OT.Data_Conf , OE.BAC-Keys
T.Eavesdropping	OT.Data_Conf , OE.BAC-Keys
T.Forgery	OT.AC_Pers , OE.Personalization , OT.Data_Int , OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper , OE.Exam_MRTD , OE.Exam_MRTD_CA , OE.Exam_MRTD_AA , OE.Pass_Auth_Sign , OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
T.Abuse-Func	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func , OE.Personalization
T.Information_Leakage	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction	OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Counterfeit	OT.AA_Proof , OT.Data_Int_AA , OT.CA_Proof , OT.Data_Int_CA , OE.Exam_MRTD_CA , OE.Activ_Auth_Verif , OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
T.Unauthorized_Load	OT.Secure_Load_ACode
T.Bad_Activation	OT.Secure_AC_Activation
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery	OT.TOE_Identification

Table 13- Threats and Security Objectives – coverage

OSP	Security Objectives
P.Manufact	OT.Identification
P.Personalization	OT.AC_Pers , OT.Identification , OE.Personalization
P.Personal_Data	OT.Data_Int , OT.Data_Conf , OT.Data_Int_CA , OT.Data_Int_AA
P.Activ_Auth	OT.AA_Proof
P.Chip_Auth	OT.CA_Proof

Table 14 - OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage

Assumptions	OE
A.MRTD_Manufact	OE.MRTD_Manufact
A.MRTD_Delivery	OE.MRTD_Delivery
A.Pers_Agent	OE.Personalization
A.Insp_Sys	OE.Exam_MRTD , OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
A.BAC-Keys	OE.BAC-Keys
A.Insp_Sys_CA	OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_CA , OE.Exam_MRTD_CA
A.Insp_Sys_AA	OE.Exam_MRTD_AA , OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
A.Signature_PKI	OE.Exam_MRTD_CA , OE.Passive_Auth_Verif , OE.Activ_Auth_Sign

Table 15 - Assumptions and OE – Coverage

The other rationales are available in the complete ST.

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13 ACRONYMS

AA	Active Authentication
BAC	Basic Access Control
CC	Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4
CPLC	Card personalization life cycle
DF	Dedicated File
DFA	Differential Fault Analysis
DG	Data Group
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EF	Elementary File
EFID	File Identifier
DES	Digital encryption standard
DH	Diffie Hellmann
I/O	Input/Output
IC	Integrated Circuit
ICAO	International Civil Aviation organization
ICC	Integrated Circuit Card
IFD	Interface device
LDS	Logical Data structure
MF	Master File
MRTD	Machine readable Travel Document
MRZ	Machine readable Zone
MSK	Manufacturer Secret Key
OCR	Optical Character Recognition
OS	Operating System
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
SFI	Short File identifier
SHA	Secure hashing Algorithm
SOD	Security object Data
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security function

INDEX

A	
A.BAC-Keys	40
A.Insp_Sys.....	39
A.Insp_Sys_AA.....	40
A.Insp_Sys_CA.....	40
A.MRTD_Delivery	39
A.MRTD_Manufact.....	39
A.Pers_Agent.....	39
Access_Control_in_reading.....	71
Access_Control_in_writing.....	71
Active_Authentication.....	71
Attacker	34
Authenticity_of_the_MRTD's_chip.....	35
B	
BAC_mechanism.....	71
F	
FAU_SAS.1/MP	59
FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code	52
FCS_CKM.1/BAC	61
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES	66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES	66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES.....	66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES	67
FCS_CKM.1/MP	54
FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code.....	52
FCS_CKM.4/Global	50
FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA	60
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA	60
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH.....	62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC	62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC	62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA	62
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES.....	68
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES	68
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES	67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES.....	67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES.....	67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES	67
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES.....	55
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES	55
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES.....	54
FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code	52
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES.....	54
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES	55
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code	52
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES.....	55
FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA.....	56
FCS_RND.1/Global	50
FDP_ACC.1/BAC	64
FDP_ACC.2/MP	56
FDP_ACF.1/BAC	64
FDP_ACF.2/MP.....	56
FDP_DAU.1/AA	60
FDP_ITC.1/AA.....	61
FDP_ITC.1/CA.....	68
FDP_ITC.1/MP.....	56
FDP_UCT.1/BAC.....	62, 70
FDP_UCT.1/MP	57
FDP_UIT.1/BAC	63
FDP_UIT.1/CA	70
FDP_UIT.1/MP	57
FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code.....	53
FIA_AFL.1/BAC	65
FIA_AFL.1/MP	57
FIA_API.1/CA.....	66
FIA_UAU.1/BAC	65
FIA_UAU.1/CA.....	68
FIA_UAU.1/MP.....	57
FIA_UAU.4/BAC	65
FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES	58
FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES	58
FIA_UAU.5/BAC	65
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES	68
FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES	58
FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES	58, 69

FIA_UAU.6/BAC.....	65
FIA_UAU.6/CA.....	69
FIA_UID.1/BAC.....	65
FIA_UID.1/CA.....	69
FIA_UID.1/MP.....	57
FMT_LIM.1/BAC.....	63
FMT_LIM.1/Global.....	50
FMT_LIM.2/BAC.....	63
FMT_LIM.2/Global.....	50
FMT_MOF.1/AA.....	61
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.....	61
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE.....	61
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ.....	63
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE.....	63
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ.....	70
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE.....	70
FMT_MTD.1/MP.....	58
FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code.....	53
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS.....	59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA.....	59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ.....	59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code.....	53
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE.....	59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code.....	53
FMT_SMF.1/MP.....	59
FMT_SMR.1/BAC.....	64
FMT_SMR.1/MP.....	59
FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code.....	53
FPT_EMS.1/AA.....	61
FPT_EMS.1/CA.....	69
FPT_EMS.1/Global.....	51
FPT_EMS.1/MP.....	60
FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code.....	53
FPT_FLS.1/Global.....	51
FPT_PHP.3/Global.....	51
FPT_TST.1/BAC.....	63
FPT_TST.1/Global.....	51, 69
FTP_ITC.1/MP.....	58
FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code.....	54
FTP_ITC.1/PP.....	70

I

IC_developer.....	34
Inspection_System.....	33

L

Logical_MRTD_data.....	34
------------------------	----

M

Manufacturer.....	33
MRTD_Holder.....	34

O

OE.Auth_Key_MRTD.....	45
OE.BAC-Keys.....	44
OE.Exam_MRTD.....	31, 44, 45, 46
OE.MRTD_Delivery.....	43
OE.MRTD_Manufact.....	43
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign.....	44
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif.....	44
OE.Personalization.....	44
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD.....	45
OT.AA_Proof.....	42
OT.AC_Pers.....	41
OT.CA_Proof.....	42
OT.Data_Conf.....	41
OT.Data_Int.....	41
OT.Data_Int_AA.....	42
OT.Data_Int_CA.....	42
OT.Identification.....	41
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func.....	41
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.....	41
OT.Prot_Malfunction.....	42
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper.....	42
OT.Secure_AC_Activation.....	43
OT.Secure_Load_ACode.....	43
OT.TOE_Identification.....	43

P

P.Activ_Auth.....	39
P.Chip_Auth.....	39

P.Manufact	38
P.Personal_Data	38
P.Personalization	38
Personalisation_Agent_Authentication	72
Personalization_Agent	33
Physical_protection	72
Prepersonalizer	34

S

Safe_state_management	72
Secure_Messaging	72
Self_tests	72
Software_developer	34

T

T.Abuse-Func	36
T.Bad_Activation	38
T.Chip_ID	36
T.Counterfeit	37, 38
T.Eavesdropping	36
T.Forgery	36
T.Information_Leakage	36
T.Malfunction	37
T.Phys-Tamper	37
T.Skimming	36
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery	38
T.Unauthorized_load	38
Terminal	33
Traveler	34